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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The German-style apprenticeship training system receives a lot of world-wide attention 
because it improves the school-to-work transition and thereby causes a lower youth 
unemployment rate (Soskice 1994, Harhoff and Kane 1997, Ryan 2001). This system further 
provides adolescents with sophisticated intermediate-level skills and allows enterprises to 
provide and pay for training in specific and general human capital (Steedman 1993, Soskice 
1994, Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b). All these characteristics recommend this system as a 
potential model for other countries (Harhoff and Kane 1997, Ryan 2001, Steedman 2001, 
Schaack 2008).  
To the contrary, the apprenticeship training market in Germany is frequently discussed in 
public and scientific press because a large number of applicants do not find an apprenticeship 
each year. This so called demand-supply gap on the apprenticeship training market has been 
continuously discussed and has been led to various economic policy measures aiming to 
increase the number of apprenticeship places in recent decades (Busemeyer 2009, 
Jacobebbinghaus et al. 2009). In spite of the advantages of an apprenticeship training system 
in an international perspective on the one hand and the discussions around the demand-supply 
gap on the other , empirical evidence on the functioning of this market is rare so far (Frick 
2006). Empirical studies mainly focus on company’s cost-benefit ratio of apprenticeship 
training (Beicht et al. 2004, Wolter et al. 2006), determinants of apprenticeship training 
companies (Harhoff and Kane 1997, Beckmann 2002), individual mobility after 
apprenticeship training (Winkelmann 1996, 1997, Euwals and Winkelmann 2004) and 
individual wage returns (Bender and Wachter 2006, Boockmann and Steiner 2006, Tuor and 
Backes-Gellner 2010). 
This thesis investigates firms’ motivation to train apprentices and contributes to the first two 
literature strands. Understanding firms’ training motivation is the key to explain the 
functioning of the apprenticeship training market. A better understanding of the 
apprenticeship training system allows an enhanced comparison to other adolescent training 
systems in an international perspective and more sophisticated design of policy measures 
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intended to influence the apprenticeship training market. In detail, this thesis shows, first, the 
heterogeneity of firms’ training motivation and presents solutions to measure the 
heterogeneity. Second, it demonstrates effects of the heterogeneous training motivations on 
firms’ human resource management strategy. Third, this thesis analyses interdependences 
between the apprenticeship training market and the industrial relations system. 
Identifying firms’ motivation to train apprentices is a major concern in economic theory. Until 
recently, the investment training motive was generally considered as the prevailing training 
motivation, i.e. the companies pay for the provision of general human capital and they do not 
recoup their costs until the end of the training period. The net costs assumption stems from a 
series of descriptive cost-benefit-studies conducted by the BIBB (Bardeleben et al. 1997, 
Beicht et al. 2004, Wenzelmann et al. 2009). Based on this stylized fact, an extensive 
literature singles out the economic rational behind this training motivation. Many 
contributions explain the willingness of firms to pay for general human capital by different 
sources of market imperfections such as monopsony, asymmetric information on personal 
traits and training contents, search and mobility costs, and labour market institutions such as 
unions or minimum wages. These contributions argue that the market imperfections allow 
firms to pay their own apprenticeship graduates less than the market wage for skilled workers 
and hereby recoup net costs incurred during the apprenticeship period (Franz and Soskice 
1995, Harhoff and Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999a, Leuven 2005, Kessler 
and Lülfelsmann 2006). More specifically, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) show that two 
conditions hold for the willingness of firms to pay for training: firms earn profits on workers 
and these profits increase with advanced training level.  
In addition to the theoretical impact, the stylized fact about firms’ training motivation is one 
of the keys for understanding and evaluating the German-style apprenticeship training. 
However, the fact itself has not been subjected to scrutiny by alternative methods or data-sets 
even if theoretical considerations and empirical evidence from other countries stress the 
relevance of two opposing training motivations: the investment and the 
substitution/production motivation (Lindley 1975, Stevens 1994, Soskice 1994, Franz and 
Soskice 1995, Harhoff and Kane 1997, Smits 2006, Wolter et al. 2006, Smits 2007, Zwick 
2007, Festerer et al. 2009). A substitution strategy, sometimes also named production 
strategy, means that the training company employs apprentices as substitutes to unskilled or 
semi-skilled workers because of their lower unit labour costs. Contrary, the investment 
strategy is defined as training companies bear net costs during training period and benefit by 
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employing skilled workers later on. The main motive of this strategy is to take advantage of 
skilled workers rather than investing, as the name suggests.  
The thesis scrutinizes the stylized fact that almost all companies incur net costs while training 
apprentices. The thesis highlights that companies’ training motivation is not homogeneous. 
Heterogeneous training motivations requires a more careful evaluation of policy measures 
designed to increase the supply of apprenticeships in order to close the demand-supply gap on 
the apprenticeship training market (Busemeyer 2009, Jacobebbinghaus et al. 2009). For 
example, both training motivations lead to different effects of lower wages for apprentices as 
a policy measure to close the demand-supply gap on the apprenticeship training market. This 
measure increases the demand of apprentices regarding the substitution motivation but has no 
effect on the demand concerning the investment training motivation.  
Chapter two presents a method for identifying both training strategies. This approach uses 
publicly available establishment-level data and identifies the training motivation based on the 
within-firm retention rate over several years, defined as the average proportion of apprentices 
staying in the training company in relation to all apprenticeship graduates of a company over 
several years. The rationale behind this approach is that retaining own apprenticeship 
graduates is a necessary condition when an establishment trains for investment reasons, but it 
is more an exception than a rule when training is based on substituting apprentices for 
unskilled employees because of lower relative unit labour costs. The within firm retention rate 
shows a strong clustering on both extremes of the distribution. Approximately 26 percent of 
all training firms hire all own apprenticeship graduates and 14 percent retain no-one over 
several years. Chapter two shows further that this classification fits to the one based on costs-
benefits data (marginal cost approach). The figure of a strong clustering of the long-term 
retention rate adds a new and interesting stylized fact of apprenticeship training. The fact that 
14 percent of training companies do not retain their own apprenticeship graduates contradicts 
the hypothesis that apprenticeship training in Germany homogeneously follows an investment 
training motivation. 
Chapter three studies firms’ training motivation in a different way and analyses whether 
German enterprises accept short-term disadvantages regarding productivity and profitability 
when they offer apprenticeships. In contrast to the descriptive costs and benefits evaluations, 
chapter three cannot directly measure the net costs of apprenticeship training during the 
apprenticeship period. Chapter three analyses, however, the arguably more relevant question 
whether establishments that increase the share of apprentices at the cost of the share of 
unskilled employees face a reduction in their profits and how establishment productivity is 
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affected. Taking into account relevant factors for establishment performance, endogeneity of 
qualification shares and unobserved time-invariant establishment heterogeneity, chapter three 
identifies the causal impact and shows that the apprenticeship training occupation makes a 
difference when comparing the impact of apprentices and unskilled workers on productivity 
and profitability. Employing apprentices instead of unskilled or semi-skilled employees in 
trade, commercial, craft, and construction occupations has a positive impact on contemporary 
establishment productivity and profitability whereas substituting apprentices for unskilled 
workers in manufacturing occupations has a negative effect on contemporary establishment 
profits but no effect on contemporary productivity.  
Both chapters analyse effects of apprenticeship training during the training period and 
pronounce the heterogeneity of the system in terms of firms’ training motivation. The 
investment and the substitution training motivation are prevalent in the apprenticeship 
training market. The heterogeneity challenges the design of policy measures intended to 
influence the apprenticeship training market.  
Furthermore, the existence of both training motivations influences also the recruitment 
strategy of training and non-training companies which is the second key question of this 
thesis. The recruitment of apprenticeship graduate is of empirical interest because freshly 
trained workers are prone to be poached. The apprenticeship training system provides 
company-sponsored training investments in transferable skills and the training contract legally 
terminates at the day after the final exam when an employment contract has to be signed. 
These characteristics can lead to positive externalities for other firms when freshly trained 
apprenticeship graduates leave the training firm, which has invested in the human capital of 
the apprentice (poaching). Such poaching externalities can lead to an under-investment in 
training (Stevens 1994, 1996, 2001, Booth and Snower 1995, Acemoglu 1997, Leuven 2005). 
Under-investment in training undermines competitiveness and economic growth and is of 
major concern for managers and politicians. Indeed, several theoretical contributions conclude 
that a poaching externality does not exist on the apprenticeship training market because of 
several market imperfections (Chang and Wang 1996, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Lazear 
2009, Leuven et al. 2004, Moen and Rosen 2004, Leuven 2005). The existence and extent of a 
poaching remains an empirical question which has not been analysed so far (Pischke 2007, 
Brunello and DePaola 2009).  
Chapter four analyses the recruitment of apprenticeship graduates as a form of poaching. 
Measuring poaching is an empirical challenge which requires linked employer/employee data 
and, more important, that trained workers can be distinguished from non-trained ones. Then, 
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we can identify poaching firms, training firms, apprenticeship graduates switching between 
both and apprenticeship graduates staying in the training firm (Pischke 2007). Apprentices, 
apprenticeship graduates and their training and poaching companies can clearly be identified 
in social security records linked to establishment-level data. Apprentices are particularly 
appropriate for poaching analyses because apprenticeships are a common training measure of 
company-sponsored training investments in transferable skills, which are observable by 
outsiders (Soskice 1994, Harhoff and Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Culpepper 
2003). Recruiting freshly trained apprenticeship graduates reveals a positive externality for 
the recruiting firm which can earn a rent on these skilled employees. A switching and costly 
trained apprenticeship graduate means anyhow an investment loss for the training firm. 
Training companies which have invested in training but cannot attract their trained employees 
may eventually train a lower number of apprentices or with a lower training quality. We show 
that poaching exists and that poaching companies more likely train apprentices themselves. 
Contrary, poached companies fail to credibly offer long-term contracts. 
The final contribution of this thesis is the institutional framework of apprenticeship training. 
Even if the apprenticeship training motivation implies incentives for companies to provide 
training, both training motivations require a framework within which companies can train and 
partly pay for formally certified skills. The framework or the institutions are the financial 
system, production of niche products and, most important, the industrial relations system. 
These institutions may explain why the German-style apprenticeship system works and the 
apprenticeship system in Britain is currently declining (Finegold and Soskice 1988, Streeck 
1989, Soskice 1994, Gospel 1995, Gospel 1998, Backes-Gellner 1996, Ryan 2000, Ryan 
2001, Culpepper 2003, Dustmann and Schönberg 2008, Lewis and Ryan 2009). Even though 
we know only little about economic effects of apprenticeship training, interdependencies 
between apprenticeship training and institutions are also a hardly researched field. 
Chapter five analyses the works councils as one key institution which supports the 
apprenticeship training system. The industrial relations system comprises employer and 
employee organisations. These organisations create trust and provide a grievance system for 
the market participants, both of which are the basis for an apprenticeship training system. On 
the one side, the apprenticeship training system depends on the ability of private employer 
organisations – notably, employers associations and chambers of craft and commerce – to 
provide employers with capacity of information circulation, deliberation, monitoring and 
sanctioning, which allow them to minimize the risk of opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
other employers (Hall and Soskice 2001, Culpepper 2003). On the other side, the 
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apprenticeship training system depends on the participation of apprentices who trust their 
representatives who monitor that employers do not exploit apprentices during the training 
period and train marketable skills. Employee associations such as unions bargain about 
apprenticeship training regulations on the national level and works councils monitor training 
implementation on the establishment-level. Apprentices in establishments with a works 
council can elect a representative who, as a part of the works council, monitors the laws, 
regulations, collective and work agreements about the implementation of apprenticeship 
training (§ 70 Works Council Act). 
Chapter five provides a first systematic analysis whether apprenticeship training is correlated 
with the establishment of a works council. Chapter five finds no significant effect. However, 
this result does not reject the hypothesis that the industrial relations system provide a 
framework within which companies can train and partly pay for formally certified skills but 
shows that single institution cannot explain it. Thus, future research should analyse bundles of 
institutions or the whole system rather than a single institution. 
The final chapter concludes. First, it shows that heterogeneous training motivations allow 
within-country analysis to understand an apprenticeship training system additionally to 
between-country analyses. Second, it presents policy implications and discusses why policy 
measures designed to influence the apprenticeship training market have to consider both 
training motivations. For instance, increasing the number of training days in vocational 
schools to practice a foreign language, for instance, raises the demand of apprentices 
regarding the investment and decreases the demand regarding the substitution motive. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Apprenticeship Training – What for: 
Investment or Substitution? 
 
in: International Journal of Manpower, forthcoming (2010) with Uschi Backes-Gellner 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The apprenticeship system in Germany is generally considered to be a company investment in 
human capital. This common belief is mainly based on the results of the German cost-benefit 
studies of the BIBB (for latest results cf. Beicht et al. 2004), which estimated that almost all 
companies have sizeable net costs of apprenticeship training.1 Since apprenticeships are 
unanimously considered to offer general skills these findings have motivated many research-
ers to study the role of market imperfections as an incentive for the training decision of com-
panies (Franz and Soskice 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999a, Dustmann and Schön-
berg 2009, Kessler and Lülfelsmann 2006). Based on these theoretical discussions, the Ger-
man apprenticeship system is often used as the institutional setting for empirical investiga-
tions of company sponsored general training (Harhoff and Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 
1998, Dustmann and Schönberg 2009). These empirical studies implicitly assume that all 
German firms which train apprentices invest in human capital but none of these studies actu-
ally checks this fact. However, in addition to an investment view, Lindley (1975) already ar-
gues that there may be a second motivation for apprenticeship training, namely a production 
or substitution strategy. He describes apprentices as productive workers who are used as 
cheap substitutes for unskilled or semiskilled workers. The substitution motivation states that 
the productivity of apprentices (who are used as regular production workers) is higher than 
their training costs and that the unit labour costs of apprentices are lower than the unit labour 
costs of other (unskilled) employees whom they substitute. 
So the first aim of our paper is to study whether the German apprenticeship system is indeed 
homogeneously a human capital investment of the companies. We develop an alternative 
                                                 
1 This refers to the full cost account which is usually cited in scientific papers. 
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method which can be used with publicly available company data to identify the two training 
strategies of firms. We argue that a sufficient condition to distinguish between the two train-
ing strategies is the within firm retention rate over several years, defined as the average pro-
portion of apprentices staying in the company in relation to all apprenticeship graduates of a 
company over several years. If an engagement in apprenticeship training is supposed to be an 
investment in human capital that earns long term returns for the company, such earnings are 
clearly only possible if a sufficient number of apprentices stays in the company after they 
have finished their apprenticeship (see the integrated model of Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a). 
In contrast, a substitution strategy does not require that apprenticeship graduates stay within 
the training company because offering apprenticeships is driven by the unit labour costs of 
apprentices in comparison to suitable substitutes. If apprentices are indeed used as cheap 
workers during the apprenticeship it can to the contrary be expected that they are too expen-
sive after their apprenticeship, meaning that retaining apprentices is rather the exception than 
the rule. If we look at the long-term within-firm retention rate we find a strong clustering on 
both extremes of the distribution. Overall, 18.5 percent of the companies nearly never hire 
their own apprenticeship graduates, while 43.75 percent of the companies hire almost all of 
their own apprenticeship graduates. We argue that companies which never hire their appren-
ticeship graduates can be clearly assigned to the substitution strategy and that companies 
which hire almost all of their graduates can clearly be assigned to the investment strategy. 
Based on this classification method we find evidence for a non negligible share of companies 
with a substitution strategy (around 18.5 percent of all training companies). This result is in 
contrast to the widely accepted stylized fact of a pure investment strategy of German firms.  
In a second step, we show the reliability of our classification method by comparing it with 
descriptive results of the most recent German cost benefit study. In a third step, we study the 
determinants of companies using a substitution strategy. We first find that the probability of 
the substitution strategy increases with lower capital equipment, with the absence of works 
councils and with a higher share of white collar workers as well as in smaller firms. We fur-
ther find that service sector firms have a significantly higher probability to follow a substitu-
tion strategy than manufacturing firms. Finally, we found complementarities between firms’ 
investments in apprenticeship training and firm sponsored continuing training. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a short literature review (section II), important insti-
tutional settings are introduced and the within firm retention rate is defined. Then, the com-
pany training strategies are verified by a comparison with the cost-benefit studies (section 
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III). Afterwards, we estimate determinants of a substitution training strategy (section IV) and 
conclude with theoretical and policy implications (section V). 
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to Beicht et al. (2004) 96 percent of the training companies incur on average net 
costs during the apprenticeships.2 They conclude that the investment strategy clearly domi-
nates while the substitution strategy can only be found on the fringes. This stylised fact has 
motivated many researchers to study the role of market imperfections as a source of the in-
vestment of German companies in apprenticeships that provide general skills (Franz and 
Soskice 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999a, Dustmann and Schönberg 2009, Kessler 
and Lülfelsmann 2006). The theoretical models explain the incentive of companies to invest 
in apprenticeships through asymmetric information (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998), comple-
mentarities between general and specific human capital (Franz and Soskice 1995, Kessler and 
Lülfesmann 2006) or labour market institutions such as unions (Dustmann and Schönberg 
2009). Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) integrate different theoretical models in one general 
framework. In contrast to the frequently modelled investment strategy, the substitution strat-
egy is mostly intuitively introduced. The substitution strategy can be analysed by a simple 
microeconomic production model with two substitutable input factors (e.g. apprentices and 
unskilled workers) in which employment is only dependent on the relative unit labour costs 
(substitution of two input factors). However, Lindley (1975) studied this strategy in a more 
complex and formal analytical framework. 
According to the theoretical discussions the German apprenticeship system is used as the in-
stitutional setting for empirical investigations of company sponsored general training (Har-
hoff and Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Dustmann and Schönberg 2009), but the 
assumption of positive net costs are not been tested. Some of these empirical studies however 
stress that apprenticeship training strategies are not unique across sectors and firm sizes 
(Soskice 1994, Franz and Soskice 1995 or Neubäumer and Bellmann 1999). For example, an 
increasing training incidence by firm size is explained by the presence of internal labour mar-
kets in larger firms. A first doubt on the overwhelming dominance of net cost argument in 
Germany occurs by the Swiss cost benefit study of Wolter et al. (2006). They find that only 
one half of the larger firms and one third of the smaller firms incur net costs during the ap-
prenticeship. The huge differences are somewhat surprising because of the similarity of both 
                                                 
2 The cost benefit study of Beicht et al. (2004) comprises two estimations. Here, we report only the full cost approach, because this is always 
cited in scientific publication. Both approaches are shown in section four. 
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training systems. However, Dionisius et al. (2009) show that a part of the difference can be 
explained by a higher share of productive tasks allocated to apprentices in Switzerland and 
the differences in comparatively lower apprentice to skilled worker wages. Finally, Zwick 
(2007) estimates the contribution of changes in the proportion of apprentices on changes in 
firm performance in Germany. He found an insignificant and not a negative effect of the 
share of apprentices on productivity which would be expected in a pure investment strategy. 
He concludes that the investment and the substitution strategy may outweigh each other on 
average and that the cost benefit study of Beicht et al. (2004) might underestimate the substi-
tution strategy. 
However, most of the cited theoretical and empirical studies fail to discuss explicitly the re-
tention rate of apprenticeship graduates as a necessary precondition for a return on invest-
ment. One exception is the theoretical model of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) in which the 
retention rate is seen as an important training incentive. Empirical studies on the retention 
rates in Germany focus only on the individual rather than on the company. These studies es-
timate the effect of mobility of apprenticeship graduates on wages or duration of the first job 
after apprenticeship (see Euwals and Winkelmann 2004 for a discussion). There are also a 
few studies investigating different sectoral retention rates e.g. by Schwerdt and Bender (2003) 
who estimate the probability of an employer changing of apprenticeship graduates and Büchel 
and Neubäumer (2001) who estimate the determinants of an employment in the training oc-
cupation for apprenticeship graduates. For Switzerland, Wolter and Schweri (2002) analyse 
the retention rate more in depth and show that the strategy of retaining apprenticeship gradu-
ates immediately after training depends substantially on the benefits derived after the appren-
ticeship but less on firms’ net costs during the training period. Furthermore, they find that 
firms which employ their apprenticeship graduates three years after graduation have heavily 
invested during the apprenticeship. However, to the best of our knowledge there is so far no 
empirical analysis based on German company data and studying the relation of retention rates 
and apprenticeship training on company level.3  
 
2.3 WITHIN FIRM RETENTION RATE AS AN INDICATOR FOR FIRMS’ TRAIN-
ING STRATEGIES 
We argue that a sufficient condition to distinguish between the two training strategies, in-
vestment or substitution motive, is the within firm retention rate which is defined as the pro-
                                                 
3 The German cost benefit studies use three year average retention rate to estimate the benefits of the apprentices training, but they do not 
report the rates. 
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portion of apprentices staying in the company in relation to all apprenticeship graduates of a 
company. If a firm’s engagement in apprenticeship training is supposed to be an investment 
in human capital, such earnings are clearly only possible if a sufficient number of apprentices 
stays in the company after they have finished their apprenticeship (see the integrated model of 
Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a).4 Consequently, if companies were to follow an investment 
strategy a minimum number of retained apprentices would be a necessary precondition be-
cause without any apprentice staying at the company positive returns on investment are not 
possible. In contrast, a substitution strategy does not require that apprenticeship graduates 
stay within the company to make it economically successful because under a substitution 
strategy offering apprenticeships is driven by the cheap labour costs of apprentices in com-
parison to their productivity during the training period. If apprentices are indeed used as 
cheap labour it can be expected - contrary to what was expected above - that after the appren-
ticeship is finished the same person is too expensive in comparison to its productivity, mean-
ing that retaining apprentices is rather the exception than the rule. So if the retention rate is 
always zero this can be assumed to be a reliable indicator for a substitution strategy. 
However, in order to reliably discriminate between companies following an investment or a 
substitution strategy, one additional condition has to be met. Since apprentices are always 
employed under fixed-term contracts (which are terminated at the end of the apprenticeship 
programme), apprentices themselves may decide not to stay in the company, meaning that not 
all apprentices are necessarily staying in the company even if a company with an investment 
motive would want them to stay. Instead, some of the apprentices may as well decide to leave 
the training firm after their apprenticeship. To account for this problem we look at the reten-
tion rate over several years to get a more reliable identification strategy for a company’s train-
ing motive. We argue that if a company which invests in apprenticeship training over several 
years cannot attract a substantial share of their apprenticeship graduates to stay in the firm, it 
is requested to withdraw from apprenticeship training because otherwise it keeps having 
negative instead of positive returns to their investment. So even if we are not able to discrimi-
nate between contract terminations induced by the firm or by the apprentice, it still helps to 
single out firms following a substitution motive because a positive within firm retention rate 
over several years is a precondition for positive returns to the investment. Thus the within 
firm retention rate helps us to empirically distinguish between the two training strategies. 
                                                 
4 In the investment strategy the investment period is defined as the training period and the return period is defined as the employment of own 
apprenticeship graduates. 
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In order to do so we calculate the average yearly retention rate of apprenticeship graduates 
based on the waves 1996 – 2005 of the IAB Establishment Panel. This representative survey 
collects yearly information about the number of apprentices, graduates and stayers and a large 
number of general firm characteristics (see Kölling 2000). The retention rates immediately 
after completion of the apprenticeship is relatively stable and vary between 60 and 67 percent, 
corresponding to Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) or Franz and Zimmermann (2002).5 So in 
the short run only about one third of apprenticeship graduates leave the training firm.  
 
Figure 2.1: The pooled cross section retention rate and the within firm retention rate of ap-
prenticeship graduates in the year 2003. 
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Source: IAB Establishment Panel, companies in 2003, N= 2697, the within firm retention rate is based on own 
calculation of the waves 1996 – 2005. 
 
However, the yearly mean of the retention rate is a result of a strong clustering on both ex-
tremes of the retention rate distribution (see figure 1 panel A) which shows that on the left 
end of the distribution nearly 21 percent of all companies do not hire their own apprentices 
and on the right end of the distribution almost 45 percent of the companies hire all of their 
apprenticeship graduates. The strong clustering of the retention rate distribution is similar in 
every year. However, to identify the training motive of one particular company we need the 
retention rate of a particular firm over a minimum number of years and we name this the 
within firm retention rate and study it over several years (for all training firms for whom we 
                                                 
5 The Berufsbildungsbericht as well as the study of Schwerdt and Bender (2003) use the weighted retention rates, whereby the weight is the 
inverse of the sample probability to the IAB Establishment Panel. The weighting leads to a 10 percent lower retention rate on average. 
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observe graduates in at least three years; see figure 1 panel B for the 2003 distribution).6 The 
distribution of the within firm retention rate over all firms shows a similarly strong clustering 
on both extremes of the distribution. Companies on the left end of the distribution in panel B 
of figure 1 never hire their own graduates over several years. At minimum, these 14 percent 
of all training companies can definitely not follow an investment strategy because they have 
no possibility of gaining returns after the investment period, i.e. after the apprenticeship ter-
mination. Thus the benefits have to be extracted during the apprenticeship period. In contrast, 
the companies on the right end of the distribution (25 percent) retain all their apprentices, 
clearly indicating that it pays to keep apprentices as skilled workers after they finish their 
apprenticeship. 
For a structural comparison of our results with results from earlier studies, namely Beicht et 
al. (2004), we use the following definition for a substitution or an investment strategy based 
on the distribution of within firm retentions: We define a firm to follow a substitution strat-
egy, if the within firm retention rate is lower than 20 percent (these are firms on the far left 
end of the distribution in figure 1 panel B). We define a firm to follow an investment training 
strategy if the within firm retention rate is higher than 80 percent over three years (these are 
the firms on the far right end in figure 1 panel B). These somewhat broader definition criteria 
have as another advantage that they also include companies which diverge slightly from their 
general retention policy due to an unexpected mismatch between the apprentices and the firm. 
According to this classification 18.5 percent of the companies’ follow a substitution strategy 
and 43.75 percent follow an investment strategy.7 
Although the low data requirements make this classification very attractive, we have to keep 
in mind the underlying assumptions when interpreting the results. First, firms with a clear 
strategy may have to change their ex-ante strategy for example due to a deteriorated eco-
nomic situation which accordingly to our classification strategy would result in a classifica-
tion into the undetermined category. This bias can occur in both training strategies; therefore 
both numbers have to be considered as a lower bound.8 A second limitation arises because 
training companies with only one apprentice require a longer observation period to be classi-
fied adequately. For example, a small company with only one apprentice can only be classi-
fied, if we observe at least three graduations during a 10 year period, for example in 1998, 
                                                 
6 The retention rate distribution remains stable if we extent the minimal observation of graduates to 4 and 5 years but the number of observa-
tions naturally decreases (see appendix). This especially occurs in small firms which train only one apprentice. 
7 If we vary the training strategy cutting points between 15/85 and 25/75 percent the summary statistics remain stable, but logical, there 
changes the number of companies. All following results are additionally calculated for different cut off points, which are shown in the 
appendix. 
8 In around 4 percent of the companies, we observe that no apprenticeship graduate is hired in one year and all graduates are hired in all other 
years. The other way around is observed in around 1.5 percent of the firms. 
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2001 and 2004. This may lead to a lower share of small firms in the classification sample than 
in the whole population. Thus, training strategies are less precisely identified for small com-
panies, i.e. the margin of error is larger. Third, firms with an investment strategy may also be 
misclassified if the firm purposefully decides to train more apprentices than required because 
they use the apprenticeship as a screening period as well. This would underestimate the in-
vestment strategy. 
 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of the substitution strategy by firm size between the within firm re-
tention rates and the cost benefit analyses of Beicht et al. (2004) 
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The data are provided by Günter Walden basing on the study of Beicht et al. (2004). The within firm retention 
rate is based on the IAB Establishment Panel.9 
 
A comparison of our classification of the training motivation is very similar with what has 
been found in the cost benefit study of Beicht et al. (2004). They study distinguishes between 
the “full cost account”, which is supposed to provide a lower bound, and the “variable cost 
account” which is supposed to provide an upper bound of the substitution strategy (see Beicht 
et al. for a discussion). Figures 2 shows that the substitution strategy decreases by firm size 
according to the variable cost approach (dark bars) as well as according to our within firm 
retention rate classification (striped bars). In contrast, the full cost approach does not show a 
decreasing substitution strategy by firm size (light bars). We also find that our approach al-
ways lies between the calculated lower and upper bound of the cost benefit study, which indi-
                                                 
9 Similar clusters are observed on factors of four and five in the respective histograms in the appendix. 
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cates that our results provide an adequate classification despite its simple method and com-
paratively low data requirements. The strong firm-size related decrease in the proportion of 
firms with a substitution strategy can be assumed to reflect the importance of internal labour 
markets in larger firms (Soskice 1994, Neubäumer and Bellmann 1999), differences in the 
training occupations or differences in collective agreements containing an obligation to hire 
firm internal apprenticeship graduates.  
 
2.4 DETERMINANTS OF A SUBSTITUTION TRAINING STRATEGY 
In the following paragraph we use our classification to study what determines whether a firm 
follows a substitution or an investment strategy with its apprenticeship training. We estimate 
the determinants of the substitution strategy in the year 2003 for which we have most obser-
vations (results however remain stable if we use other years or vary the cut off points in the 
classification step; detailed results for alternative estimations are given in the appendix). 
The results of the 2003 regression analysis based on the above mentioned cut-off definition 
firstly show an increasing probability of a substitution strategy with a larger proportion of 
white-collar workers in comparison to the reference group of unskilled blue-collar workers.10 
This can be interpreted as a consequence of typical internal labour market characteristics. 
Internal labour market studies show that for blue-collar workers internal labour markets are 
much stronger, leading to a longer tenure and a higher probability of company sponsored 
general training, whereas for white collar workers internal labour markets are less strong and 
therefore firm sponsored general training should be lower (Janssen and Pfeiffer 2009). Inter-
nal labour markets also explain why larger firms are less likely to train with a substitution 
strategy: with increasing firm size the probability of internal labour markets rises and, there-
fore, the apprenticeships as an important port of entry into the internal labour market are more 
likely.11 This is in line with the argument of Soskice (1994) who describes the role of internal 
labour markets as central for the apprenticeship system, because it helps large and medium-
sized companies to retain their apprentices and it provides young people with a strong incen-
tive to strive for an apprenticeship in those companies. Larger firms can therefore attract more 
able adolescents, as theoretically shown by Franz and Soskice (1995). The higher immediate 
retention rate allows larger firms to invest in more expansive training. 
                                                 
10 Apprentices are not counted as employees. 
11 We modelled a continuous concave function of the firm size, but the maximum lies outside the observed firm size distribution. 
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Table 2.1: Marginal Effects of a Probit Regression. 
Dependent Dummy Variable: one = substitution strategy and zero = investment strategy. 
 Coefficient Z-Value  Coefficient Z-Value 
Share of White Collar Worker 0.0939 1.62  0.0973 1.69 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar Worker 0.0437 0.73  0.0427 0.72 
Export Share of the Revenue -0.0008 1.23  -0.0008 1.32 
Labour Turnover 0.0430 0.29  0.0461 0.32 
Log(Investment) -0.0098 3.59  -0.0095 3.50 
Works Council* -0.0637 2.49  0.0060 0.17 
Collective Bargaining Contract* 0.0286 1.25  0.0668 2.46 
Interaction Works Council Collective Bar-
gaining Contract*    -0.1059 2.42 
Firm Older than 5 Years* -0.0107 0.41  -0.0128 0.50 
Foreign Owned Company* -0.0647 1.80  -0.0569 1.57 
Workforce Development in the Last Year -0.0005 1.31  -0.0005 1.28 
Company Sponsored Further Training* -0.0759 2.01  -0.0766 2.02 
Located in East Germany* -0.2226 4.11  -0.2256 4.19 
Firm Size -0.0002 2.53  -0.0002 2.46 
Firm Size Square/ 1000000 0.0103 2.89  0.0099 2.84 
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.0330 5.81   0.0337 5.93 
Number of Observations  1357   1357 
Pseudo R²  0.2504   0.2546 
log Likelihood  -533.53  -530.5884 
* Dummy variable; the regression include 13 industry dummies, all service sectors are negative and mostly 
significant, while the manufacturing sectors are all positive (and mostly significant). Reference category: share 
of unskilled blue collar workers. Source: own calculations with the IAB Establishment Panel 2003 basing on 
classification on the waves 1996-2005. 
 
Thirdly, we find that service sector firms are significantly more likely to follow a substitution 
strategy than manufacturing firms meaning they retain on average significantly fewer appren-
tices over several years. This corresponds with a lower importance of internal labour markets 
in service sector firms (Janssen und Pfeiffer 2009) and that these firms require more general 
skills (Smits and Zwick 2004). This can theoretically be explained by the skill weights ap-
proach of Lazear (2003) who shows that more general bundles of skills lead to a higher prob-
ability of an external job offer (see also Geel et al. 2008). This causes a higher mobility of 
apprenticeship graduates in the service sector as a result of their more general combination of 
skills.12 Basing on the skill weights approach, Geel et al. (2008) show that a higher mobility 
of apprenticeship graduates correspond with a more general combination of skills. Therefore, 
service sector firms are more likely requested to ensure cost neutral apprenticeship training 
and their apprentices have to be more productive during the apprenticeship than apprentices 
                                                 
12 This paper analyses the mobility based on the companies view. Similar results of sectoral different mobility on an individual perspective 
are shown by Schwerdt and Bender (2003) or Franz and Zimmermann (2002). 
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in other sectors where the combination of acquired skills is more specific. Evidence for a 
higher productivity of service sector apprentices is provided by Mohrenweiser and Zwick 
(2009) based on six years social security panel data study. They find a higher productivity of 
apprentices in commercial and trade occupations in comparison to manufacturing apprentices. 
Thus, if the service sector becomes more important in the future, this could result in an in-
creasing importance of the substitution strategy if nothing else changes.  
Fourthly, we find that a firm’s coverage by a collective bargaining agreement results in a 
higher (but insignificant) probability of a substitution strategy whilst a firm with a works 
council have a significant lower probability of a substitution strategy. This is in line with the 
argument that works councils raises company sponsored training expenditures using their co-
determination rights on personnel matters especially the skill development (Müller-Jentsch 
1995). These co-determination rights may be used to negotiate with the business management 
about an obligatory employment contract of apprenticeship graduates leading to a higher re-
tention rate and this result in to a declining probability of the substitution strategy. This de-
scribes theoretically the voice function of employee representation which is widely associated 
with works councils operating on the company level whereas collective bargaining takes 
place mostly on the industry level and it is carried out by trade unions. Indeed, the interaction 
between works councils and collective bargaining is pronounced as the important link to un-
derstand the German system of industrial relation because works councils are more beneficial 
if the company is covered by a collective bargaining contract meaning that the distributional 
conflicts are delegated to the industry level (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). Interestingly, an inter-
action term (works council and collective bargaining) enforces the pure collective bargaining 
effect which results now in a significant higher probability of the substitution strategy. This 
can be interpreted that if a company faces a collective bargaining contract which can be asso-
ciated with a binding minimum wage (here especial for unskilled workers) but not a works 
council it uses apprentices as substitutes for unskilled workers, i.e. they do not retain their 
apprenticeship graduates. Otherwise, the works council itself has no effect on the training 
strategy as long as the company is not covered by a collective bargaining agreement which 
means that the distributional conflicts are not delegated to the industry level. Indeed, the cov-
erage of a works council and a collective bargaining contract decrease the probability of a 
substitution strategy (interaction effect). Here, the distributional conflicts are negotiated on 
the industry level and the works council may now use the co-determination rights to negotiate 
a job offer for apprenticeship graduates and this changes the role of apprentices within a 
company fundamentally. These findings support the argument of Hübler and Jirjahn (2003), 
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who state that the interaction between works councils and collective bargaining is as funda-
mental as the firm size in explaining the German system of industrial relations. 
Moreover, a higher capital equipment per employee leads to a lower probability of a substitu-
tion strategy indicating complementarities between physical and human capital (Franz and 
Soskice 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a). Another interesting result is that a higher ex-
port share which is a common measure for a firms’ competitiveness does not lead to a lower 
probability of a substitution strategy. This indicates that a stronger competitive environment 
is obviously not an obstacle for training investments. Interestingly, foreign owned firms are 
also not more likely to follow a substitution strategy. Although, foreign owned firms have a 
lower probability to train apprentices, those firms obviously do not train to substitute un-
skilled workers with low wage apprentices. Finally, the negative relation between investment 
in further training and a substitution training strategy indicates complementarities between 
initial and further training expenditures. Additionally, we have controlled for changes in la-
bour demand by taking into account the workforce development in the last year and the re-
gional unemployment rate. The first makes sure that hiring of a company’s own apprentice-
ship graduates is not a pure question of a rising labour demand. The latter controls for re-
gional labour market differences.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Apprenticeship training in Germany is typically seen as an investment of companies into the 
human capital of their apprentices in many theoretical and empirical studies over the last dec-
ades. This view is based on the German cost benefit studies which provide evidence for sub-
stantial net costs for firms training apprentices. However, this assumption has not been recon-
firmed by other types of data or methods so far. We show that apprenticeship training firms 
does not follow one homogeneous strategy. Rather, some firms follow an investment strategy 
and others follow a substitution strategy. We suggest an empirical method based on a detailed 
analysis of retention rates to distinguish between both strategies. According to our classifica-
tion, we find 18.5 percent of all companies to follow a substitution strategy and 43.75 percent 
to follow an investment strategy; the rest is mixed or undetermined. We can further show that 
our classification method is in line with structural features of the available cost benefit stud-
ies; the within firm retention rate distribution is located between the full and the variable cost 
account estimates of Beicht et al. (2004). The classification based on within-firm retention 
rates is attractive because it is applicable in public available databases. It is well suited to 
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classify substitution motivated training firms but it is less precise in identifying the invest-
ment motivation. Moreover, very small firms which train only one apprentice need longer 
panel duration and therefore classification results are less precise for very small firms. 
In a third step we estimate which firm characteristics determine a substitution strategy as de-
fined above. We find that the probability of a firm following a substitution strategy increases 
with lower capital equipment, with the absence of works council, with a higher share of white 
collar workers and in smaller companies. We further find that service sector firms have a sig-
nificantly higher probability to follow a substitution strategy than manufacturing firms and 
complementarities between firms’ investments in initial training and firm sponsored continu-
ing training. 
Our findings complement previous empirical analyses. Previous studies about the training 
motivation require cost benefit data but this data can not be linked to other data sets and lack 
a panel dimension by construction. The within-firm retention rate allows now a suitable ap-
proximation of the training motivation in Social Security Records and the IAB Establishment 
Panel. The training motivation is political and scientific important because companies with a 
substitution strategy employ apprentices because of their lower unit labour costs and, thus, 
they react strongly to relative wages of apprentices. Their decisions may be in sharp contrast 
to the decisions taken by firms training apprentices according to an investment strategy be-
cause the latter care more about future returns and training quality rather than lower wages of 
apprentices. Thus we conclude that a sound analysis of apprenticeship training and its deter-
minants firstly needs to distinguish firms training according to an investment or a substitution 
strategy. This classification can further be used to test theories about company sponsored 
general training. 
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APPENDIX: 
 
Figure 2.A1: Within firm retention rate distribution of apprenticeship graduates by minimum 
observations increase: 
Minimum Observation: 4, (N=2027) Minimum Observation: 5, (N=1505) 
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Table 2.A1: Descriptive statistics, all classified companies in 2003. 
 
Number 
of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Proportion of Substitution strategy firms 1357 0.2181 0.4131 0 1 
Share of White Collar Worker 1357 0.4383 0.2880 0 1 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar Worker 1357 0.3987 0.2899 0 1 
Export Share of the Revenue 1357 17.88 25.49 0 100 
Labour Turnover 1357 0.0245 0.0544 0 0.8913
Log(Investment) 1357 6.5903 3.5041 0 14.72 
Works Council* 1357 0.6308 0.4828 0 1 
Collective Bargaining Contract* 1357 0.6787 0.4671 0 1 
W' Council and Collective B' Contract* 1357 0.5195 0.4998 0 1 
Firm Older than 5 Years* 1357 0.1496 0.3568 0 1 
Foreign Owned Company* 1357 0.1120 0.3155 0 1 
 Workforce Development in the Last Year 1357 -4.46 47.96 -701 445 
Company Sponsored Further Training* 1357 0.9285 0.2577 0 1 
Located in East Germany* 1357 0.3589 0.4798 0 1 
Firm Size 1357 379.16 1075.49 1 19443 
Regional Unemployment Rate 1357 13.19 5.45 6.9 21.8 
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Table 2.A2: Descriptive statistics, substitution strategy companies in 2003. 
 
Number 
of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Share of White Collar Worker 296 0.5064 0.3277 0 1 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar Worker 296 0.3799 0.3277 0 1 
Export Share of the Revenue 296 5.09 15.53 0 100 
Labour Turnover 296 0.0329 0.0700 0 0.5714
Log(Investment) 296 4.9113 3.8336 0 12.44 
Works Council* 296 0.3716 0.4841 0 1 
Collective Bargaining Contract* 296 0.5912 0.4924 0 1 
W' Council and Collective B' Contract* 296 0.2838 0.4516 0 1 
Firm Older than 5 Years* 296 0.2264 0.4192 0 1 
Foreign Owned Company* 296 0.0332 0.1795 0 1 
 Workforce Development in the Last Year 296 -3.86 53.83 -701 350 
Company Sponsored Further Training* 296 0.8412 0.3661 0 1 
Located in East Germany* 296 0.5270 0.5001 0 1 
Firm Size 296 123.53 770.52 1 13080 
Regional Unemployment Rate 296 15.58 5.51 6.9 21.8 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.A3: Descriptive statistics, investment strategy companies in 2003. 
 
Number 
of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Share of White Collar Worker 1061 0.4193 0.2731 0 1 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar Worker 1061 0.4040 0.2784 0 1 
Export Share of the Revenue 1061 21.45 26.56 0 100 
Labour Turnover 1061 0.0222 0.0489 0 0.8913
Log(Investment) 1061 7.0587 3.2574 0 14.72 
Works Council* 1061 0.7031 0.4571 0 1 
Collective Bargaining Contract* 1061 0.7031 0.4571 0 1 
W' Council and Collective B' Contract* 1061 0.5853 0.4929 0 1 
Firm Older than 5 Years* 1061 0.1282 0.3344 0 1 
Foreign Owned Company* 1061 0.1338 0.3406 0 1 
Workforce Development in the Last Year 1061 -4.63 46.21 -323 445 
Company Sponsored Further Training* 1061 0.9529 0.2120 0 1 
Located in East Germany* 1061 0.3120 0.4635 0 1 
Firm Size 1061 450.47 1136.27 2 19443 
Regional Unemployment Rate 1061 12.52 5.24 6.9 21.8 
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Table 2.A4: Marginal Effects of Probit Regression in different years, with the same cut off 
point 20/80, the 2003 regression is reported in the text. 
Dependent dummy variable: one = substitution strategy and zero = investment strategy. 
 2001: 20/80 2003: 20/80  2005: 20/80 
 Coefficient Z Coefficient Z  Coefficient Z 
Share of White Collar Worker 0.1346 2.34 0.0973 1.69  0.0885 1.33 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar 
Worker 0.0927 1.63 0.0427 0.72  0.0478 0.71 
Export Share of the Revenue -0.0018 2.34 -0.0008 1.32  -0.0008 1.26 
Labour Turnover -0.0347 0.24 0.0461 0.32  0.0860 0.52 
Log(Investment) -0.0111 3.37 -0.0095 3.50  -0.0103 3.48 
Works Council* -0.0170 0.45 0.0060 0.17  -0.0183 0.49 
Collective Bargaining 
Contract* 0.0617 2.31 0.0668 2.46  0.0558 2.02 
Interaction W' Council  
Collective B' Contract* -0.1139 2.49 -0.1059 2.42  -0.0657 1.44 
Firm Older than 5 Years* -0.0227 0.83 -0.0128 0.50  -0.0134 0.51 
Foreign Owned Company* -0.0338 0.89 -0.0569 1.57  -0.0648 1.76 
Workforce Development in the 
Last Year -0.0001 0.66 -0.0005 1.28  0.0004 1.10 
Company Sponsored Further 
Training* -0.0675 1.98 -0.0766 2.02  -0.0357 0.98 
Located in East Germany* -0.1235 2.22 -0.2256 4.19  -0.0965 2.16 
Firm Size / 10 -0.0002 0.40 -0.0017 2.46  -0.0027 3.68 
Firm Size Square/ 1000000 0.0004 0.44 0.0099 2.84  0.0202 4.01 
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.0205 3.84 0.0337 5.93  0.0196 3.98 
Number of Observations  1341  1357   1045 
Pseudo R²  0.2101  0.2546   0.2656
log Likelihood -532.01 -530.5884  -405.42004 
* Dummy variable; including 13 industry dummies, all service sectors are negative and mostly significant, while 
the manufacturing sectors are all positive (and mostly significant). Reference category: share of unskilled blue 
collar workers. Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2003 basing on classification on the waves 1996-2005, own 
calculations. 
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Table 2.A5: Marginal Effects of Probit Regression with different cut off points in 2003, the 
20/80 regression is reported in the text. 
Dependent dummy variable: one = substitution strategy and zero = investment strategy. 
 2003: 15/85 2003: 20/80  2003: 25/75 
 Coefficient Z Coefficient Z  Coefficient Z 
Share of White Collar Worker 0.0513 1.29 0.0973 1.69  0.0738 1.33 
Share of Skilled Blue Collar 
Worker -0.0130 0.32 0.0427 0.72  0.0052 0.09 
Export Share of the Revenue -0.0005 1.16 -0.0008 1.32  -0.0008 1.37 
Labour Turnover 0.0118 0.12 0.0461 0.32  0.0784 0.53 
Log(Investment) -0.0068 3.49 -0.0095 3.50  -0.0100 3.85 
Works Council* 0.0267 1.12 0.0060 0.17  0.0122 0.37 
Collective Bargaining  
Contract* 0.0462 2.55 0.0668 2.46  0.0477 1.77 
Interaction W' Council  
Collective B' Contract* -0.0705 2.24 -0.1059 2.42  -0.0899 2.19 
Firm Older than 5 Years* -0.0075 0.44 -0.0128 0.50  -0.0114 0.45 
Foreign Owned Company* -0.0405 1.58 -0.0569 1.57  -0.0489 1.40 
Workforce Development in the 
Last Year 0.0001 0.18 -0.0005 1.28  -0.0006 1.47 
Company Sponsored Further 
Training* -0.0372 1.39 -0.0766 2.02  -0.1044 2.73 
Located in East Germany* -0.1584 4.16 -0.2256 4.19  -0.1890 3.51 
Firm Size -0.0003 3.35 -0.0002 2.46  -0.0002 2.79 
Firm Size Square/ 10000 0.0128 3.36 0.0099 2.84  0.0124 3.17 
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.0243 5.97 0.0337 5.93  0.0290 5.32 
Number of Observations  1106  1357   1521 
Pseudo R²  0.3086  0.2546   0.2395
log Likelihood -379.57 -530.5884  -620.26407 
* Dummy variable; including 13 industry dummies, all service sectors are negative and mostly significant, while 
the manufacturing sectors are all positive (and mostly significant). Reference category: share of unskilled blue 
collar workers. Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2003 basing on classification on the waves 1996-2005, own 
calculations. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
WHY DO FIRMS TRAIN APPRENTICES?  
THE NET COST PUZZLE RECONSIDERED 
 
A shortened version is accepted for publication in Labour Economics, with Thomas Zwick  
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The German dual apprenticeship system is often regarded as a potential model for other coun-
tries because it allows enterprises to provide and pay for training in specific and general hu-
man capital (Harhoff and Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b, Steedman 2001). The 
stylised fact that companies invest in skills of their apprentices stems from an influential se-
ries of descriptive cross-section costs and benefits evaluations by the Federal Institute for 
Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung, BIBB). Since appren-
ticeships are unanimously considered to partly offer general skills, the assumption of inevita-
ble net costs during apprenticeship training is a puzzle which has motivated many theoretical 
studies to analyse market imperfections as a source of company-sponsored general training. 
Many empirical studies of the German apprenticeship system also make the assumption of net 
costs without testing it. While there seems to be an abundance of theoretical explanations for 
the stylised fact of net costs, the ‘fact’ itself has not been subjected to scrutiny, although it is 
one of the keys to understanding the dual apprenticeship system and to evaluating it by com-
parison to other training systems. 
In this paper we therefore aim to reconsider the question whether German enterprises have to 
accept short-term disadvantages when they offer apprenticeships. In contrast to the descrip-
tive costs and benefits evaluations we cannot directly measure the net costs of apprenticeship 
training during the apprenticeship period. We can, however, analyse the arguably more rele-
vant question whether establishments that increase the share of apprentices at the cost of the 
share of unskilled or semi-skilled employees face a reduction in their profits and how estab-
lishment productivity is affected. Taking into account relevant factors for establishment per-
formance and endogeneity of qualification shares as well as unobserved time-invariant estab-
lishment heterogeneity we are able to identify the causal impact. 
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We show that employing apprentices in trade, commercial, craft, and construction occupa-
tions instead of unskilled or semi-skilled employees has a positive impact on contemporary 
establishment performance. In contrast, substituting apprentices for unskilled worker in 
manufacturing occupations has a negative effect on contemporary establishment performance. 
These results shed new light on discussions of the German apprenticeship system. Training 
companies accept on average short-term establishment performance disadvantages only in 
manufacturing occupations in order to obtain adequately trained employees. These occupa-
tions require more specific skills and have stronger internal labour markets than other occupa-
tions. In addition, skilled employees in these occupations are hard to hire on the external la-
bour market. 
The paper is structured as follows: first we present an overview of the discussion of whether 
establishments incur net costs during apprenticeship training (section 2). Then we describe 
our theoretical framework (section 3) and our estimation approach (section 4). In the fifth 
section we discuss our data set and in section six we present the results. The paper ends with a 
discussion of our results. 
 
3.2 COSTS AND BENEFITS OF APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING 
There is an extensive literature that singles out the dual apprenticeship system in Germany as 
an anomaly because the companies seem to pay for the provision of general human capital 
and they do not recoup their costs until the end of the training period (Franz and Soskice 
1995; Harhoff and Kane 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; 1999b). This seems to be a puz-
zle because firms should only be interested in paying for specific non-transferable skills, 
while the apprentices should pay for general skills themselves. 
Many contributions try to solve this perceived puzzle by explaining the willingness of 
firms to pay for general human capital by different sources of market imperfections. External 
firms might find it difficult to judge the quality of the training programme in other firms 
(Katz and Ziderman 1990, Chang and Wang 1996) or there might be asymmetric information 
about the productivity of apprentices (Elbaum and Singh 1995, Franz and Soskice 1995, 
Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). Moreover, there might be complementarities between general 
and firm-specific skills. General skills can be used more efficiently when the worker has 
some firm-specific knowledge and skills and it is possible for the training firm to get some of 
the returns of general training (Franz and Soskice 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a,b, 
Kessler and Lülfesmann 2006). Furthermore, labour market institutions, such as minimum 
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wages, unions or works councils, can cause a human capital investment incentive (Acemoglu 
and Pischke 1999a, Dustmann and Schönberg 2009). Finally, there might be other costs for 
apprentices and employees when apprentices move to another employer after their appren-
ticeship period such as mobility costs, search costs, training on the job etc. (Harhoff and Kane 
1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). These contributions argue that the market imperfections 
allow firms to pay their own apprenticeship graduates less than the market wage for skilled 
workers and hereby recoup net costs incurred during the apprenticeship period (Harhoff and 
Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a). More specifically, Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999a) show that there are two conditions for the willingness of firms to pay for training: 
firms earn profits on workers and these profits are increasing in training level.  
These theoretical contributions are all based on the stylised fact of net costs during the ap-
prenticeship period. The net costs assumption stems from a series of descriptive cost-benefit-
studies conducted by the BIBB (Bardeleben et al. 1997; Beicht et al. 2004, Wenzelmann et al. 
2009). These evaluations calculate relevant costs during apprenticeship training for about 50 
occupations and compare them with the economic value of the productivity contribution of a 
typical apprentice. Evaluations are based on surveys of about 2,500 (personnel) managers 
who assessed one occupation each. They consistently find that all occupations and almost all 
companies face sizeable net costs during the apprenticeship period.1  
There are only three related studies we are aware of which analyse the causal effect of ap-
prentices on firm or establishment performance in multivariate approaches. Fougère and 
Schwerdt (2002) find a positive effect of apprentices on value added only in medium-sized 
German establishments. Problematic in their cross section study is that the reference qualifi-
cation group is “other than unskilled and skilled workers” and therefore not specified. Askil-
den and Nilsen (2005) analyse the recruitment of apprentices during the business cycle in 
Norway. They find that apprentices are substitutes for skilled workers and are primarily re-
cruited in boom phases. Zwick (2007) finds on the basis of panel estimations that an increase 
in the share of apprentices does not decrease profits on average.  
                                                 
1 This refers to the full cost account, which is usually cited in scientific publications. Please note that the net 
apprenticeship costs calculated in the most recent cost benefit report are clearly lower on average than in the 
previous reports and a substantial share of firms are shown to enjoy net surpluses from training (Wenzelmann et 
al. 2009) . 
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3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Contrary to previous studies, we treat apprentices not as a homogenous group, but we demon-
strate that differentiating between occupational groups can teach us more about the motiva-
tion of enterprises to hire apprentices. Apprenticeships differ in their expected mobility of 
apprenticeship graduates.2 This is easily modelled by a two stage game, where the establish-
ment trains apprentices in the first stage and can employ them in the second stage, probably 
taking advantage of market imperfections discussed above. However, expected mobility of 
apprenticeship graduates in the second stage differs between occupations because of the firm-
specificity of acquired skills and internal labour markets.3 If expected mobility is low, an es-
tablishment can invest in skills of apprentices and gain by employing former apprentices in 
the second stage. Otherwise, an establishment is forced to exploit productive work of appren-
tices already in the first stage. Establishments can use both strategies.  
The German apprenticeship system is characterised by a duality of training sites, which 
means that apprentices spend 1-2 days a week in a vocational school, and 3-4 days in the 
training company (Franz and Soskice 1995). The integration of apprentices in the production 
process is an important part of the German apprenticeship system, because companies can 
(partly) recoup training costs during the training period. The value of productive work and 
costs of apprentices in the first stage should be compared to those of unskilled workers.4 A 
potential substitutability between apprentices and unskilled or semi-skilled workers is de-
scribed by Lindley (1975) and Harhoff and Kane (1997). It can be analysed within a simple 
micro-economic production model with two substitutable input factors (apprentices and un-
skilled or semi-skilled workers) where employment shares are dependent on their relative unit 
labour costs (Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner 2010). 
Therefore, we aim at establishing a causal relationship between the decision of an establish-
ment to recruit apprentices instead of unskilled or semi-skilled workers and its performance. 
Therefore, we use the production function framework proposed by Dearden et al. (2006). We 
divide the employees (L) in different skill and professional groups (s), where θ  refers to their 
productivity differences: 
                                                 
2 Different retention rates for similar groups are also shown by Büchel and Neubäumer (2001). See also footnote 
4 for different retention rates in our sample. 
3 Obviously, the specificity of training in the first stage drives the wage loss of employer switchers in the second 
stage (Geel and Backes-Gellner 2009). 
4 A comparison of the net costs of apprentices with those of unskilled or semi-skilled workers can be interpreted 
as a lower bound: if apprentices are on average not as productive as unskilled workers, then companies do not 
employ apprentices in order to cut unit labour costs. In other words, they invest in apprentices during the train-
ing period (at least as long as wage compression is low for unskilled workers). 
CHAPTER 3: Why do Firms Train Apprentices? – the Net-Cost Puzzle Reconsidered 
28 
 
∑ +=
s
sLL )1( θ . (3.1) 
 
Then we define a reference category and multiply all summands by L
L , logarithmise, use the 
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Then we insert (3.2) in a standard logarithmic Cobb Douglas function and solve this to get: 
 
∑++=
s
ssi lkA θβαπ lnln ,  (3.3) 
 
where π  is the establishment productivity per capita, k is the capital per head and the l are the 
proportions of different employee or professional groups s in the company i at time t while A 
are other company or market characteristics. The parameters α  and β  are the elasticities of 
the Cobb Douglas function for capital and labour respectively and θ  presents the productivity 
differences between the employee and profession groups. This analytical framework repli-
cates the decision of personnel managers to hire an apprentice instead of an unskilled or semi-
skilled employee including all other relevant employer and employee information. 
This framework allows to estimate a causal relationship between the decision of an estab-
lishment to recruit apprentices instead of unskilled or semi-skilled workers and its perform-
ance. We argue that a different impact on establishment performance is caused by the ex-
pected mobility of apprenticeship graduates in certain occupations depending on specificity of 
skills and internal labour markets. We consider three occupational groups: manufacturing 
occupations, craft and construction occupations, and trade and commercial occupations. This 
classification is chosen so that the impact of the occupation groups on establishment perform-
ance is as homogeneous as possible.5  
                                                 
5 The retention rates according to our occupational groups are 72 percent in trade and commercial, 77 percent in 
manufacturing and 61.5 percent in construction and crafts. Note that these retention rates are slightly higher than 
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The first group of apprentices consists of commercial and trade occupations, which are com-
monly named white collar workers. White collar workers mostly acquire transferable, general 
skills such as languages, IT or social skills (Smits and Zwick 2004). More general skill bun-
dles lead to a higher probability of an external job offer (Lazear 2003) and a higher mobility 
of apprenticeship graduates (Geel and Backes-Gellner 2009). Therefore, establishments with 
apprentices in commercial occupations are more likely forced to ensure that costs and benefits 
of apprenticeship training are not worse than hiring unskilled or semi-skilled employees. We 
therefore propose our first hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.1: The share of apprenticeships in commercial and trade occupations is in-
creased at the cost of the share of unskilled or semi-skilled workers if apprentices have at 
least the same effect on value added and profits as unskilled or semi-skilled workers. 
 
Second, apprentices in manufacturing occupations are generally considered to acquire a 
highly specific combination of skills. This reduces the transferability of skills between estab-
lishments and gives training establishments bargaining power after graduation (Soskice 
1994). In addition, blue collar workers, such as manufacturing apprentices, are generally con-
sidered to face strong internal labour markets in establishments that provided their appren-
ticeship training. Soskice (1994) therefore describes the first skilled job after graduating in 
these occupations as possible ports of entry into the internal labour market. The specific skill 
bundles and internal labour markets result in a lower probability for apprentices to leave the 
training establishments. This increases incentives for companies to hire apprentices even if 
their cost/benefit relation is less attractive than that of unskilled or semi-skilled employees 
because they have a high chance to recoup investments incurred during the apprenticeship 
training after taking the apprentices over as skilled employees. In other words, a high reten-
tion rate of manufacturing apprentices driven by the specificity of training enables companies 
to invest more in training and profit from employing the graduates. Furthermore, it is not easy 
to find skilled employees in manufacturing occupations on the labour market and therefore 
establishments have to offer apprenticeship training themselves in order to be able to get new 
skilled employees in the future (Fougère and Schwerdt 2002). This leads to our second hy-
pothesis:  
                                                                                                                                                        
those reported in official statistics because we restrict our sample to establishments with more than 20 employ-
ees and retention rates rise by establishment size (Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner 2010). 
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HYPOTHESIS 3.2: Apprenticeships in manufacturing occupations are also offered if the im-
pact of apprentices on profits or value added during the apprenticeship training period is 
lower than that of unskilled or semi-skilled employees. 
 
The final occupational group consists of crafts and of construction occupations. These occu-
pations are characterised by a relatively low retention rate and a high occupational mobility 
after the apprenticeship (Soskice 1994). For most craft employees, switching from one em-
ployer to another is easy because most skills are not company-specific. Moreover, crafts and 
construction companies face a strong product market competition, which forces them to cut 
labour costs and hire apprentices if they have lower unit labour costs than their substitutes. 
Moreover, these apprentices obtain a certain productivity level rather quickly (Wolter et al. 
2006). 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.3: The share of apprenticeships in craft and construction occupations is in-
creased at the cost of the share of unskilled or semi-skilled workers if the apprentices have at 
least the same effect on value added and profits as unskilled or semi-skilled workers. 
 
Since our theoretical considerations show strong differences between occupations, our occu-
pational classification is not the same as the one used in the BIBB study by Beicht et al. 
(2004), who mainly differentiate occupations by the institutions involved (for example cham-
bers of commerce and industry vs. chambers of crafts). 
 
3.4 EMPIRICAL FRAMWORK 
We estimate a standard Cobb Douglas Production Function including the number of employ-
ees, weighted by their occupation or skill level (Dearden et al. 2006) in order to assess the 
causal effect of employing apprentices instead of unskilled and semi-skilled employees on 
establishment performance in the three occupational groups. Rewriting (3.3), the effect is 
identified by the coefficients of the apprentices’ occupation shares because we use the share 
of unskilled and semi-skilled employees as reference unit: 
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tiiiititititit uxcraftsmancom ,321ln ++′+++= ηβδδδπ , (3.4) 
 
where t is a time indicator, i is an establishment indicator, com, man and crafts are the propor-
tion of apprentices in commercial and trade, manufacturing, crafts and constructions occupa-
tions, respectively, and δ equals to β times the respective θ.6 The dependent variable π meas-
ures the establishment performance per capita and x is a column vector of other covariates. 
Finally, η  denotes unobservable time-invariant factors and u stands for the normally distrib-
uted error term. 
Our estimation procedure takes into account different sources of estimation bias or endogene-
ity problems such as selectivity, unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and simultaneity. In 
order to assess changes incurred by estimation biases, and as a benchmark, we start with a 
pooled OLS estimation, i.e., a cross-section, which treats observations of an establishment 
from different years as independent.  
We control for time-invariant unobserved variables influencing both establishment perform-
ance and share of apprentices (unobserved establishment heterogeneity: 0),( ≠=ηxE ) by 
estimating the model in first differences or by demeaning the cross-section equations. Unob-
served heterogeneity causes an upward-bias when good industrial relations or good personnel 
management lead to better establishment performance on the one hand and to higher appren-
ticeship training endeavours on the other. This estimation explains the change in establish-
ment performance from one year to the next by means of a change in the composition of em-
ployee qualifications and other covariates, or in other words we switch from a between estab-
lishments to a within establishments analysis. 
The fixed effects results can still be biased either positively or negatively. The source of this 
estimation bias is endogeneity of the share of apprentices. First, establishments may alter their 
qualification structure and their performance simultaneously and both may be influenced by 
exogenous shocks. For example, simultaneity can induce a downward bias if relatively low 
establishment performance is a signal for a structural labour costs problem, which establish-
ments might try to solve by substituting apprentices for unskilled workers. Otherwise, posi-
tive demand shocks induce an upward bias if they lead establishments to increase the number 
of apprentices in order to satisfy their future skilled labour needs. Another source of estima-
tion bias is selectivity in apprentice training (Wolter et al. 2006). These three sources of esti-
                                                 
6 The list of occupations in the three groups can be found in Appendix Table 3.A5. 
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mation bias are replaced in our third estimation specification by an instrumental variable 
panel regression. It is convenient, in this respect, to use general method of moments (GMM) 
estimation with internal instruments. Since lagged internal instruments do not pose causality 
problems, contemporary external instruments might have given the assumptions stated below. 
More precisely, we prefer the System GMM Estimator, which instruments the first differ-
ences of explanatory variables with corresponding levels of lagged variables and the levels 
are simultaneously instrumented by adequate lagged differences. Potentially endogenous 
variables need the lags t-2 and predetermined ones the lags t-1 (Blundell and Bond 1998). We 
therefore need at least four time periods, where the fourth lag is the instrument. The main 
advantage of this approach is that besides temporary differences, differences in levels be-
tween establishments are also taken into account. This improves information used in identify-
ing the effect and usually enhances the precision of the estimator. Therefore, we first make 
the so-called sequential exogeneity assumption ( ),(0),( 2,1,,1,, −−− −==Δ tititititi uuxEuxE ), 
which means that contemporary exogenous shocks have no impact on lagged explanatory 
variables. A second necessary condition is that correlations between unobserved fixed effects 
and first differences of covariates remain constant over time.7 In our investigation this means, 
for example, that personnel management or industrial relations do not change much over the 
analysed time period of six years.  
The estimations are carried out with the help of a two-step method under the application of 
Windmeijer’s adjustment process for variances (Windmeijer 2005), using the command 
xtabond2 in STATA 9.2 (Roodman 2006). In addition, we impose common factor restrictions 
using a minimum distance estimator in order to obtain a single coefficient for all covariates in 
the dynamic model (Blundell and Bond 1998).8 
We can identify the effect of changes in the proportion of occupational groups of apprentices 
on establishment performance because of adjustment costs and strict labour market regula-
tion. First, dismissal protection allows establishments to directly affect their share of appren-
tices, but shrinking establishments may face an inefficient composition of staff because em-
ployees cannot be replaced and laid off at will. Second, there may be a lack of suitably skilled 
job applicants. As a consequence, some establishments might not have their optimal em-
ployee mix and an increase in the share of a particular employee group would influence estab-
lishment performance. 
                                                 
7 This is also called the stationarity assumption. 
8 The DPD package of the System GMM estimator displays both results but it is not included in the STATA 
version. 
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3.5 DATA 
Our data are taken from the waves 1997-2002 of the linked employer-employee data set of 
the IAB (LIAB). The LIAB combines Federal Employment Agency individual-based em-
ployment statistics with plant-level data from the IAB Establishment Panel. The distinctive 
feature of the LIAB is the combination of administrative information on individuals and de-
tails concerning establishments that employ those (Jacobebbinghaus 2008). 
The information on the schooling level of employees in the employment statistics may be 
inconsistent because the information is not obligatory. Therefore we use the correction 
method proposed by Fitzenberger et al. (2006). One performance measure is gross profits. In 
order to calculate gross profits, we deduct the total wage bill and the share of inputs from 
revenues. For the calculation of the wage bill we have to take into account that roughly 11 per 
cent of the sample is top coded at the earnings ceiling for social security contributions. We 
therefore impute wages for those employees at the censored level. To this end, we first create 
20 cells differentiated by gender, education (the six schooling groups identified in Appendix 
Table 3.A1) and nationality (German vs. non-German), and run censored wage regressions 
for each cell. The covariates comprise age, age squared, and dummies for job characteristics. 
Further, our procedure takes into account that the level at which wages are top coded differs 
between eastern and western Germany and is adjusted every year. Predicted wages for each 
censored observation are then calculated and imputed for each individual.  
All labour-related variables are calculated from the reliable individual Social Security Re-
cords and all establishment-related variables are compiled from the IAB Establishment Panel. 
We use the so-called longitudinal version of the LIAB in order to be able to derive unbiased 
indicators of yearly means of our apprenticeship occupation groups.9  
We exclude not-for-profit organisations, agriculture and mining establishments, as well as 
establishments that do not report sales (such as banks and insurance companies). We also 
exclude establishments with fewer than 20 employees10 and any establishments that have 
more than 60 per cent apprentices in their workforce. In addition, only individuals aged be-
tween 16 and 64 years and covered by social security are included in the sample. We also 
                                                 
9 In Jacobebbinghaus et al. (2008), we show that apprenticeship shares are particularly low at the point in time 
when the cross section LIAB is measured (June 30th each year) – and more importantly that the differences 
between the proper yearly average and the apprenticeship share on June 30th differs between occupation groups 
(e.g. three year training for most commercial and trade occupations and three and a half year for manufacturing 
occupations). 
10 This excludes the group of firms for which the calculated net costs are near to zero (Beicht et al. 2004).  
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omit all employees with wages lower than the minimum income limit for compulsory social 
insurance, and apprentices who earned more than the social security contribution ceiling. 
Matching selected employees to establishments results in a sample of 1879 establishments. 
Our establishment performance variable is on the one hand gross profit per capita. On the 
other hand, establishment performance is measured by productivity per head, calculated by an 
establishment’s revenue minus inputs. As we do not have a variable directly indicating capital 
and capital costs in the panel, we can only include investments as a control variable proxy, 
using the perpetual inventory method (Zwick 2004). We assume that using aggregated in-
vestments instead of capital is innocuous, especially in the estimation specifications based on 
differences, because it seems improbable that capital costs vary with the proportion of ap-
prentices employed. Investments, gross profits, value added and employee characteristics are 
divided by the number of employees in order to avoid having to measure scale effects such as 
a positive correlation between levels of investments and profits. Further, we take logs on in-
vestments, value added and gross profits in order to reduce the potential impact of outliers. 
 
3.6 FINDINGS 
Our three occupational groups cover 85 per cent of all apprentices. More specifically, com-
mercial and trade occupations cover 25 per cent, crafts and construction occupations 30 per 
cent and manufacturing occupations 30 per cent of all apprentices. The entire summary statis-
tics on establishment (mean) characteristics for the estimation sample used for the System 
GMM regressions are given in Table 3.A1 in the appendix. 
In a first step, we analyse the impact of apprentices on gross profits in the three occupational 
groups in comparison to semi- and unskilled workers. Afterwards, this is compared with the 
relative effect of apprentices on productivity. The differences show us whether apprentices 
are attractive because they increase productivity or merely because they have lower wages. 
Our pooled OLS estimation in Table 3.1 suggests that the contribution of apprentices to gross 
profits in commercial and trade occupations is significantly positive in comparison to that of 
unskilled or semi-skilled workers. In contrast, the contribution of crafts and construction ap-
prentices, as well as that of manufacturing apprentices, is significantly negatively correlated 
with the gross profit. All further covariates have expected signs (see Table 3.A2 in the appen-
dix): higher investments per capita, presence of works councils, collective bargaining, and 
export share are positively correlated with gross profits. The share of employees with a lower 
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than tertiary-level qualification has a negative correlation, while the share of employees with 
a higher qualification is positively correlated with gross profits. 
If we accept the OLS estimates, our results would imply that an increase in the share of ap-
prentices in commercial or trade occupations at the cost of unskilled workers increases gross 
profits by almost two percentage points. The analogous figures are a decrease by more than a 
half percentage point for the other two apprentice occupation groups. These are non-
negligible figures. The pooled regression is possibly biased, however, because observations 
of the same establishment in different years are considered as independent, and endogeneity 
cannot be taken into account. The Fixed Effects Regression (FEM) that accounts for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity has a smaller number of significant coefficients. The con-
tribution of all apprentice groups to establishment performance is now insignificant. 
In order to tackle endogeneity, we prefer a System GMM approach with lagged levels and 
lagged differences, respectively, as internal instruments and the lagged endogenous variable 
as explanatory variable. More specifically, we treat worker-related variables as potentially 
endogenous (apprentices’ occupation and job characteristics – see appendix) and instrument 
them with lags (t-2) and all further available lags. The investment variable is seen as prede-
termined and is instrumented with lag (t-1) and further lags. All establishment-related vari-
ables are seen as exogenous (works councils, industry and so on, see appendix). The System 
GMM Estimation is reported in Table 3.A3 in the appendix. All test statistics confirm our 
specification (autocorrelation tests and test of over-identification restrictions). Taking en-
dogeneity into account shows that apprentices in commercial and trade occupations have a 
higher positive impact on gross profits than unskilled and semi-skilled workers, according to 
Hypothesis 3.1. In detail, a one per cent increase in the proportion of commercial apprentices 
raises contemporary gross profits by around one per cent. The apprentices in commercial and 
trade occupations are obviously on average sufficiently productive and receive sufficiently 
low wages so that their unit labour costs make them as attractive as semi-skilled or unskilled 
employees during the training period. In accordance with our second hypothesis, the contribu-
tion of manufacturing apprentices to establishments’ gross profits is negative in comparison 
to unskilled workers. These apprenticeships therefore impose a burden on establishments dur-
ing the training period, and their benefits have to come from employing own apprenticeship 
graduates. Further, apprentices in craft and construction occupations have a significantly 
more beneficial impact on gross profits than unskilled workers, which confirms our third hy-
pothesis. The employment of these apprentices is more beneficial than employing unskilled 
workers. 
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Table 3.1: Gross profit estimation, dependent variable: log(value added minus total wage bill 
per capita), productivity estimation, dependent variable log(value added) 
  OLS FEM Sys GMM 
  Gross Profits Gross Profits Gross Profits Productivity
Share of Apprentices in:                 
Commercial or Trade Occ. 1.810
(7.26)
* -0.385
(0.99)
 0.995 
(2.57) 
* 2.210
(3.63)
*
Manufacturing Occ. -0.732
(3.63)
* -0.236
(0.69)
 -1.165 
(2.51) 
* -0.043
(0.07)
 
Crafts or Constructions Occ. -0.767
(4.06)
* 0.227
(0.62)
 1.376 
(3.58) 
* 1.446
(2.36)
*
Number of Establishments 8169 2146 1879 1879 
R² / Number of Instruments 0.1710 0.0186 288 288 
Comments: t-values in parenthesis. Full output in the Appendix Tables 3.A2-3.A4, reference category: share of 
unskilled workers. * significant on the 5 percent level.  
Source: LIAB waves 1997–2002. 
 
In contrast to manufacturing occupations, training establishments do not need to take over 
apprenticeship graduates in these occupations. Finally, the lagged endogenous variable and 
the proportion of skilled employees have a significantly positive impact on gross profits, 
while the proportion of part-time employees and the size of investments per capita have no 
impact. Exporting establishments and establishments with works councils have higher gross 
profits, establishments in East Germany have a lower productivity (see Table 3.A3). 
The effect on gross profit is the relevant reason to increase the share of apprentices at the cost 
of the share of unskilled workers. We cannot infer, however, whether this effect stems from 
relative productivity or from the wages of apprentices. In order to disentangle both effects, we 
additionally estimate productivity regressions (Table 3.1 and Appendix Tables 3.A2-3.A4). 
Comparing both parts of the tables suggests that usually the impact on productivity is more 
positive (or less negative) than the impact on gross profit. This means that commercial ap-
prentices are more productive than unskilled workers (given their productive working time), 
but their relatively higher training wages reduce the benefits. Nevertheless, apprentices still 
have more favourable unit labour costs than unskilled or semi-skilled workers. Another pos-
sible interpretation is that the costs of an increase in the proportion of apprentices are higher 
than those of an increase in the proportion of unskilled or semi-skilled employees, where one 
has o take the salary costs for supervisors into account. The additional supervisor costs are 
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smallest in craft and construction occupations (Beicht et al. 2004). In these occupations, gross 
profit impact is only slightly lower than that of productivity.11  
In order to check the robustness of our results, we also calculate everything in deviations 
from sector means. This slightly changes the interpretation because we cancel out level ef-
fects between sectors. Now the question is whether a higher-than-average share of apprentices 
in certain occupations in the sector goes hand in hand with a higher gross profit than the sec-
tor average. The results are very similar to those presented before and therefore we do not 
display them separately here. Furthermore, we run all regressions for those establishments 
that offer apprenticeships only. This does not change the results significantly, either. This is a 
consequence of our within enterprise identification strategy whereby non-training establish-
ments have no additionally explanatory power. Finally, we run all regressions for the average 
apprenticeship share instead of differentiating between occupations groups. We obtain a re-
sult analogous to that found by Zwick (2007): increasing the share of apprentices at the cost 
of unskilled and semi-skilled employees does not have an impact on gross profits (and pro-
ductivity). 
 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presents the first causal assessments of the impact of different occupational groups 
of apprentices on enterprise performance. It shows that it is necessary to discriminate between 
different groups of occupations when assessing the motivation of enterprises to train appren-
tices. In particular, we find that employing apprentices in trade, commerce, craft, and con-
struction occupations instead of unskilled and semi-skilled employees has a positive impact 
on contemporary gross profits. In contrast, an increase in the share of apprentices in the 
manufacturing occupations reduces contemporary gross profits. This means that enterprises 
offering apprenticeships in manufacturing occupations accept a lower performance during the 
apprenticeship period in comparison to hiring unskilled or semi-skilled employees.  
Our findings shed a new light on the stylised fact based on descriptive cross-section analyses 
that almost all training enterprises necessarily incur net costs during apprenticeship training. 
Our results are compatible with these findings if on average unskilled and semi-skilled em-
ployees have higher marginal wages than productivity in activities for which apprentices in 
commercial and trading as well as in construction and craft occupations can be hired. We 
argue, however, that the absolute level of measurable costs and benefits during apprenticeship 
                                                 
11 A test of equality of the coefficients is rejected. 
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training is less important for the decision on the share of apprentices than their marginal con-
tribution in relation to substitutes (unskilled or semi-skilled employees). Our approach there-
fore imitates the decision process of personnel managers on the share of apprentices in differ-
ent occupations and takes into account unobserved heterogeneity between establishments and 
endogeneity of the qualification structure. 
This paper demonstrates the operation of the German apprenticeship system: companies train 
skills in manufacturing occupations at a cost if apprentices stay more likely in the training 
establishment, the human capital acquired is relatively specific, and it is difficult to hire ade-
quately skilled employees elsewhere. Otherwise, they offer apprenticeships in occupations 
with more general skills and higher between-establishment mobility only if apprentices are at 
least as attractive as the employment of suitable substitutes such as unskilled or semi-skilled 
employees. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 3.A1: Descriptive Statistics (means at establishment level) 
  Mean S.D. 
Dependent variables:   
Log(Value Added per Capita) 11.2463 0.5490 
Log(Gross Profits per Capita) 10.7928 0.8851 
Distribution by Apprentices Occupation:   
Commercial and Trade 0.0110 0.0246 
Manufacturing 0.0146 0.0315 
Crafts and Construction 0.0110 0.0341 
Other 0.0080 0.0235 
Distribution by Job Characteristics:   
Share of Apprentices 0.0445 0.0517 
Share of Unskilled Workers 0.1776 0.2370 
Share of Skilled Workers 0.7116 0.2551 
Share of Part Time Workers 0.0637 0.1422 
Share of Others 0.0025 0.0119 
Distribution by Schooling Level:   
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship  0.1081 0.1232 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and with a Sec-
ondary School Degree 
0.7099 0.1883 
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship and with 
Higher Education Entrance Certificate 
0.0412 0.0662 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and with 
Higher Education Entrance Certificate 
0.0346 0.0446 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree 0.0488 0.0662 
Share with a University Degree 0.0574 0.0960 
Share of Workers, Older than 55 0.0962 0.0672 
Share of Foreigners 0.0369 0.0793 
Establishment Characteristics:   
Log(Investment per Capita) 12.6168 2.4377 
Establishment founded during last 5 Years 0.0644 0.2455 
Dummy: Exporting Establishment 0.3913 0.4881 
Dummy: Works Council 0.5747 0.4944 
Dummy: Collective Bargaining Contract 0.6503 0.4769 
Dummy: Located in East Germany 0.6131 0.4871 
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Table 3.A1 continued: 
Distribution by Establishment Size:   
20-100 0.5881 0.4922 
101 - 500 0.3245 0.4682 
>500 0.0874 0.2824 
Number of Establishments 5916   
* Profit per capita and investment per capita are added with a constant - the largest negative number found in the 
variables - to make sure that all values are positive and hence can be logarithmised. 
** Full time workers can be divided in different job characteristics but not part time workers.  
Source: LIAB Wave 1997 – 2002, sample used for System GMM regressions, see Tables 3.A4 and 3.A5. 
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Table 3.A2: OLS Estimations 
  Productivity Gross Profit 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers): 
    
Commercial and Trade 2.1780 5.63 1.8105 7.26 
Manufacturing -1.1139 -3.56 -0.7326 -3.63 
Crafts and Construction -1.5074 -5.14 -0.7671 -4.06 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: Unskilled 
Workers): 
    
Share of Skilled Workers 0.0778 1.57 0.0195 0.61 
Share of Part Time Workers -0.1418 -1.86 0.0879 1.79 
Schooling Level (Ref.: without Completed 
Apprenticeship and with Tertiary School 
Degree): 
    
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship  -0.3514 -2.77 -0.1472 -1.80 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and 
with a Secondary School Degree 
-0.2521 -2.87 -0.0932 -1.65 
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship 
and with Higher Education Entrance Certifi-
cate 
1.4827 6.88 0.9374 6.75 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and 
with Higher Education Entrance Certificate 
0.4683 2.71 0.2395 2.15 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree 0.7379 5.21 0.2814 3.08 
Share of Workers, Older than 55 -0.6003 -4.41 -0.4142 -4.71 
Share of Foreigners -0.2081 -1.40 -0.1909 -2.00 
Establishment Characteristics:     
Log(Investment per Capita) 0.0797 18.19 0.0485 17.18 
Establishment founded during last 5 Years 0.0296 0.91 0.0366 1.75 
Dummy: Exporting Establishment 0.1476 6.15 0.0755 4.88 
Dummy: Works Council 0.2186 9.73 0.0815 5.62 
Dummy: Collective Bargaining Contract 0.0500 2.33 0.0225 1.63 
Dummy: Located in East Germany -0.4496 -19.13 -0.1791 -11.82 
R2 0.2415  0.171  
F (39, 8129) 66.38  42.99  
Number of Establishments 8169  8169  
Notes: Regressions also include 2 firm size dummies, 11 industry, 1 dummy for employees with unknown occu-
pational qualification, 1 dummy for apprentices with other occupations, and 5 year dummies. Productivity: 
log(value added per capita), Gross Profits: log(value added minus total wage bill per capita).  
Source: LIAB 1997-2002 
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Table 3.A3: System GMM Estimations 
  Productivity Gross Profits 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
L1 (y) 0.4645 9.99 0.4921 9.36 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers):     
Commercial and Trade 3.6501 1.85 2.6991 2.09 
L1  -1.7284 -1.32 -0.7956 -1.01 
Manufacturing 0.1115 0.05 -0.2360 -0.17 
L1  -0.1800 -0.09 0.4902 0.38 
Crafts and Construction -0.4419 -0.24 0.2117 0.19 
L1  -0.8977 -0.50 -0.8303 -0.82 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: Unskilled 
Workers):     
Share of Skilled Workers 0.7127 1.24 0.1543 0.41 
L1 -0.5903 -1.13 -0.1726 -0.49 
Share of Part Time Workers 1.6057 1.67 0.5583 0.97 
L1 -1.1382 -1.16 -0.2430 -0.41 
Schooling Level (Ref.: without Completed 
Apprenticeship and with Tertiary School 
Degree): 
    
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship  0.2183 0.40 0.1612 0.47 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and 
with a Secondary School Degree 
-0.1690 -0.45 -0.0321 -0.15 
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship 
and with Higher Education Entrance Certifi-
cate 
1.8793 2.03 1.3738 2.17 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and 
with Higher Education Entrance Certificate 
1.4316 1.77 0.9485 1.58 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree -0.1444 -0.22 -0.3942 -0.95 
Share of Workers, Older than 55 0.1869 0.43 0.0658 0.22 
Share of Foreigners -0.7441 -0.96 -0.3717 -0.70 
Establishment Characteristics:     
Log(Investment per Capita) 0.0120 0.44 0.0090 0.54 
L1 0.0104 0.39 -0.0006 -0.04 
Establishment founded during last 5 Years 0.0408 1.12 0.0253 1.10 
Dummy: Exporting Establishment 0.0767 2.31 0.0443 2.12 
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Table 3.A3 continued 
Dummy: Works Council 0.0839 2.65 0.0296 1.52 
Dummy: Collective Bargaining Contract 0.0306 1.27 0.0077 0.53 
Dummy: Located in East Germany -0.2284 -2.79 -0.0590 -1.19 
Number of Establishments 1879  1879  
Number of Instruments 288  288  
Wald chi2(47) 1365.70  876.10  
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1) in First Dif-
ferences (p-Value) 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2) in First Dif-
ferences (p-Value) 
0.53 
 
0.77 
 
Hansen Test of Overidentification Restric-
tions (p-Value) 0.13  0.08  
Notes: see Table 3.A2. The variable y is the dependent variable, i.e,. productivity or gross profits. 
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Table 3.A4: Minimum Distance Estimators after System GMM 
  Productivity Gross Profits 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
L1 (y) 0.4280 11.02 0.4773 10.35 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers):     
Commercial and Trade 2.2102 3.63 0.9952 2.57 
Manufacturing -0.0434 -0.07 -1.1659 -2.51 
Crafts and Construction 1.4465 2.36 1.3762 3.58 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: Unskilled 
Workers):     
Share of Skilled Workers 0.9439 5.16 0.2757 2.35 
Share of Part Time Workers 1.6006 4.78 0.2266 1.12 
Log(Investment per Capita) -0.0133 -1.11 0.0032 0.40 
Notes: Only variables displayed which include contemporary and lagged variables. The variable y is the depend-
ent variable, i.e., productivity or gross profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.A5: List of Occupational Categories 
 Number of occupation in IABS 
Commercial and Trade 681-706,751-773,781-784,856,922 
Manufacturing 141-162,191-291,311-323,541-543,547,631-634,744,857 
Crafts and Construction 53,121-135,163-177,302-306,391-422,441-514,544-
546,741-744,804,901-921,923-937 
Note: the plain text of the selected occupations can be found in Jacobebbinghaus (2008).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
POACHING AND APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING: 
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Unpublished working paper, with Uschi Backes-Gellner and Thomas Zwick  
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Human capital is one of the key determinants of firms’ productivity and innovativeness 
(Black and Lynch 1996, Zwick 2005, Dearden et al. 2006). Skill upgrading, hiring skilled 
workers and training new recruits are therefore important decisions for the competitiveness of 
each company. Costs of skill upgrading and training are mostly paid by employers 
independently of whether the accumulated skills can be transferred to other employers 
(Bassanini et al. 2007, Brunello and DePaola 2009). Company-sponsored training investments 
in transferable skills indeed induce the possibility of positive externalities to other firms when 
freshly trained workers are poached from the training firm. The poaching firm can satisfy its 
skill demand without own training investments and the poached firm might lose (part of) its 
training investments. Poaching therefore can lead to an under-investment in training because 
firms are hesitant to pay for the acquisition of skills for workers that leave before the training 
investments are paid-off. Under-investment in training undermines the competitiveness of 
companies and is of major concern for managers and politicians. Therefore, an important 
theoretical literature strand has developed that tries to explain the determinants of poaching 
(Lazear 1986, Cahuc et al. 1990) and the consequences of poaching for training investments 
(Stevens 1994, 1996, 2001, Booth and Snower 1995, Acemoglu 1997, Moen and Rosen 2004, 
Leuven 2005, Lazear 2009).  
Existence, extent and determinants of poaching, however, remain an empirical question which 
is not analysed so far (Pischke 2007, Brunello and DePaola 2009). Measuring poaching is an 
empirical challenge because ideally we need to know first which firm attracts employees 
against the will of the training firm and second which of those employees have been costly 
trained. In available data sets, we usually do not know exactly the costs and benefits of 
training, the time lag between continuing training and departure or to what extent training 
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rents are shared between employer and employees (Pischke 2007). Moreover, a poaching 
analysis requires linked employer/employee panel data because it is based on characteristics 
of employees who switch their job combined with information of the training and poaching 
firm. 
We address the empirical identification of costly trained departures induced by poaching by 
focusing on apprenticeship graduates. Apprentices are particularly appropriate for poaching 
analyses because apprenticeships are a company-sponsored training investment in observable 
and transferable skills. In particular, the Vocational Training Act determines the skills and 
final exams requirements in each training occupation and we have an indication which 
occupations require higher training investments than others (Beicht et al. 2004, Mohrenweiser 
and Zwick 2009). Further, employment of apprenticeship graduates is not contractible since 
apprenticeships legally terminate at the day after the last exam (non-enforceable contract) so 
that a new employment contract has to be signed (Soskice 1994, Franz and Soskice 1995, 
Harhoff and Kane 1997, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Ryan 2001, Culpepper 2003, Smits 
2007, Dustmann and Schönberg 2009,). Moreover, employees who just graduated from an 
apprenticeship in a certain occupation are a relatively homogeneous group and therefore 
differences between earnings of those taken over by the training firm and those coming from 
another training firm are a good indicator whether the apprentice was attracted by a better 
wage offer or triggered by not getting an offer from the training firm. Finally, apprentices, 
apprenticeship graduates and the characteristics of the firms that trained them and the firms 
that poached them can clearly be identified in individual social security records linked to 
establishment-level data. 
We evaluate the determinants of poaching by analysing firms that recruit apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere and training firms which lose these workers. Recruiting freshly 
trained workers reveals a positive externality to the recruiting firm when it can earn a rent on 
these skilled employees. This is the case when a switching and costly trained apprenticeship 
graduate, is an investment loss for the training firm. Training companies which have invested 
in training but cannot keep their trained employees may eventually train a lower number of 
trainees or reduce the quality of training. We show that poached companies fail to credibly 
offer long-term contracts and, that companies offering long-term contracts can attract 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere. Moreover, poaching companies more likely train 
apprentices themselves. Non-training companies fail to effectively recruit freshly trained 
apprenticeship graduates. This may be an indicator for a segmented labour market where 
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training and non-training companies recruit differently. Our results characterise for the first 
time poached and poaching establishments with a focus on apprenticeship training.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: The next section reviews the poaching 
literature, derives hypotheses and describes our empirical design. Then, we describe our data, 
variables, empirical strategy and present our findings. The last section concludes. 
 
4.2 Background Discussion 
Poaching Models. Theoretical models of company sponsored training investments define 
poaching differently (see Stevens 2001 for a discussion). This paper defines poaching when 
the poaching firm hires freshly trained workers instead of training these employees itself and 
the training company would like to keep the trained employee and loses some training 
investment costs (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999).1 
Poaching can take place when firms invest in the human capital of their employees and the 
future employment is ex-ante non-contractible so that a hold-up problem arises. Moreover, the 
future employer rewards the newly acquired skills and pays a higher salary than the training 
company, e.g. training in transferable skills (Stevens 2001, Leuven 2005, Pischke 2007). 
Transferability of skills, e.g. the degree of applicability in outside firms, is a precondition for 
poaching (Stevens 1996, 2001). Stevens points out that poaching exist for transferable skills 
but it does not exist either for purely general or specific skills. The degree of transferability 
drives the probability of separation and the training investment by the firm. Contrary, Kessler 
and Lülfelsmann (2006) argue when general and specific human capital are complements 
from the firm´s point of view poaching takes only place when sufficiently general human 
capital is acquired, because specific skills create a wedge between workers’ productivity in 
the training and outside firm. Similarly, Lazear (2009) argues that each skill is general but the 
combination of skills makes them specific for a company. Hence, poaching is not a problem 
as long as a bundle of general skills is more valuable in the training than in any other firm and 
the training firm can pay a higher salary because it rewards the whole skill bundle whereas the 
poaching firm would only reward some of them. In addition, skills also have to be observable 
by outsider firms (Lazear 1986). Visibility and transparency of skills increase the probability 
of an outside offer. 
                                                 
1 A somewhat weaker definition defines poaching when training is lower than the social optimum (Stevens 1994, 
1996, Moen and Rosen 2004). This definition is more appropriate to study the efficiency of training provided in 
an economy. 
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Several contributions discuss mechanisms which can prevent poaching. Although training is 
transferable and other firms would offer higher wages, Moen and Rosen (2004) show that 
poaching is less severe or even non-existent when the training firm gets a reputation for 
rewarding skill collection and credibly offers long-term contracts. Training investments may 
be considered as a commitment device which reduces turnover. In addition, employees might 
prefer to stay with their training firms although they obtain a higher wage offer from a 
rivalling firm (Sadowski 1980, Moen and Rosen 2004).  
Similarly, Cahuc et al. (1990) argue that firms with internal labour markets can keep their 
employees as they wish and hire freshly skilled employees from other firms because they 
offer superior labour contracts and employees prefer those contracts. Moreover, they split 
firms with training investments into those that poach (they call them dominating firms) and 
those which lose some of their trained workers although they incur a loss by that (the so-
called dominated firms). They show that poaching does not necessarily replace own training 
efforts.  
Taken together, poaching implies non-contractible future employment, investment in 
transferable skills which are observable by outsiders. However, the reputation of the training 
firm to credibly offer long-term contracts can solve the poaching externality.  
 
Empirical Design. In addition to the theoretical preconditions, an empirical framework for 
analysing poaching requires a unique definition of training across firms. An appropriate 
framework is apprenticeship training.  
First, apprenticeships offer a consistent definition of training across companies because 
training has to follow a prescribed curriculum which is laid down in the Vocational Training 
Act. The Vocational Training Act describes necessary equipment and requirements which 
have to be fulfilled to train apprentices adequately and the (minimum) skills which have to be 
trained in each training occupation. Moreover, apprentices get a graded skill certificate at the 
end of the training period. The observance of these guidelines and the final exam is monitored 
by the chambers of industry and craft (Franz and Soskice 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). 
Second, these training regulations further imply that training is observable by outsider firms. 
Third, the skills are not only observable but also transferable due to the institutional 
arrangements which severely limit firms’ ability to structure apprenticeship training so that it 
involves mostly firm-specific training. Fourth, future employment of apprenticeship graduates 
is non-contractible. Apprenticeship training contracts legally terminate at the day after the 
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final exam and employment has to be negotiated at the end of the training. Fifth, 
apprenticeships are a training investment for a part of the training companies. Training firms 
in blue-collar occupations in manufacturing generally invest in their apprentices whereas 
training firms in white-collar occupations recoup the training costs until the end of the 
apprenticeship due to the productive work of the apprentices (Mohrenweiser and Zwick 2009, 
Wenzelmann et al. 2009). Sixth, skilled employees starting their first job are a relatively 
homogeneous crowd. Thus, we can compare the general market wage of skilled job starters 
directly after finishing their apprenticeship training with the wage of employer switchers 
(Göggel and Zwick 2009). To identify poached skilled employees, we define them as those 
employees who switch employers and obtain a higher wage than the market wage for job 
starters in their occupation. Those job starters who get the market wage or less than the 
market wage might be former apprentices who did not get an offer from their training firm 
and they are, therefore, not poached. Seventh, we observe whether a skilled job starter 
changes his or her occupation. We argue that those who change their occupation can not be 
classified as poached employees because the new employer’s capacity to acquire rents from 
previous training investments is small. 
Taken together, apprentices receive a broadly accepted, visible and transparent training 
certificate at the end of their training period that makes them flexible in accepting a skilled 
job in either their training company or another company. Firms have to attract apprenticeship 
graduates either to stay or to switch. Moreover, apprentices and apprenticeship graduates are 
easy to identify in linked employer employee datasets where we can follow apprenticeship 
graduates switching employers and identify characteristics of the training and poaching firm. 
Furthermore, information asymmetries between potential recruiting firms may play a minor 
role because it is not convincing to believe that companies with and without union coverage 
for instance have different information about potential recruits. To the contrary, both types of 
firms have an expectation about the average ability of apprenticeship graduates based on the 
signal an apprenticeship degree in a certain occupation conveys (Heckman et al. 1994) on 
long-term occupational retention rates. 
 
4.3 Data, Variables and Empirical Strategy 
Data. We use the longitudinal version 2 of the linked employer-employee data set of the IAB 
(LIAB). The LIAB combines Federal Employment Agency individual-based employment 
statistics with plant-level data from the IAB Establishment Panel. The distinctive feature of 
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the LIAB is the combination of administrative information on individuals and details 
concerning establishments that employ those. The longitudinal version of the LIAB comprises 
all establishments with three consecutive observations in the IAB Establishment Panel 
between 1999 and 2002 and all employees who worked at least one day in those 
establishments between 1997 and 2003. For every employee, the data report the complete 
employment history since 1993 (Jacobebbinghaus 2008).  
The LIAB longitudinal data are particularly suited for our analysis because the employment 
history is available as spell-data. The spell-data allow a day-based calculation of every 
recruitment, lay-off and status change (occupation change, apprentices to skilled worker) in 
those establishments, and the exact calculation of employment and unemployment duration of 
every individual.  
We recalculate tenure and experience for each employee summing only employment days 
subjected to social insurance contribution after the apprenticeship (or internship for university 
graduates). Moreover, the information on the schooling level of employees in the employment 
statistics may be inconsistent because the information is not obligatory. Therefore we use the 
correction method proposed by Fitzenberger et al. (2006). We restrict the data to spells after 
1998 because we cannot distinguish apprentices from internees before 1999 (Jacobebbinghaus 
et al. 2009). In addition, we include only individuals aged between 16 and 64 years which are 
covered by social security and we exclude not-for-profit organisations, agriculture and mining 
establishments. Further, all labour-related variables are calculated from the individual social 
security records and all establishment-related variables are compiled from the IAB 
Establishment Panel. We match growth data downloaded from the Federal Statistical Office. 
Matching selected employees to their establishments results in a sample of 6572 
establishments with 16937 observations. 
 
Variables. We analyse the determinants of poaching and poached establishments. Poached 
establishments are identified by the within-firm retention rate, defined as the proportion of 
apprenticeship graduates staying in the training establishment on all apprenticeship graduates. 
This variable captures the proportion of apprenticeship graduates attracted by the training 
firm. Moreover, we calculate the proportion of internal recruits, e.g. the proportion of own 
apprenticeship graduates on all newly hired workers holding an apprenticeship degree. This 
variable additionally measures whether training companies can meet their own demand of 
skilled workers with own apprentices. 
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Poaching apprenticeship graduates is measured with three variables. The first variable 
measures the proportion of poaching on new recruits, defined as the proportion of newly hired 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere (first job after apprenticeship) on all newly hired 
workers with an apprenticeship degree. The second variable specifies poaching only counting 
recruits paid a salary above the market level in the numerator. The nominator is the same so 
that this variable specifies poaching when the poaching firm pays high wages. The third 
variable further limits the group of employer switchers to those who did not switch their 
occupation.  
We discuss firms’ reputation to offer long-term contracts (internal labour markets) as a 
strategy to avoid poaching. Ariga et al. (2000, p. 71-81) argue that seniority is not fully 
informative of internal labour markets because the same average tenure can be consistent with 
substantially different employment policies in other firms. They therefore propose to combine 
firm specific tenure with general experience in order to characterise internal labour markets 
instead of just looking at average tenure. In this line, we calculate the difference between 
experience and tenure. This difference is close to zero in companies which usually hire 
workers at the beginning of their career because they offer internal careers. The difference 
increases when the company does not offer internal careers and therefore more likely hires 
experienced workers.  
Establishments’ reputation to offer long-term contracts is further measured by signals which 
are observable and verifiable by outsiders (Tuor and Backes-Gellner 2010). External 
indicators are the coverage of a works council, a collective bargaining agreement and the age 
of the establishment. Such signals may be important in the recruiting process since company 
specific workplace characteristics such as job security, working conditions and career 
opportunities are unobservable for potential employees. Instead these characteristics are 
related to observable employer signals such as works councils or establishment age (Smits 
2006, Tuor and Backes-Gellner 2010). A works council, for example, may be a credible 
signal for potential hires suggesting a higher probability of long-term career perspectives, 
more family friendly practices, fostering human capital generation and better working 
conditions (Smith 1991, Backes-Gellner et al. 1997, Heywood and Jirjahn 2009, Addison et 
al. 2010). Collective bargaining agreements signal higher wages for potential hires which may 
be an argument to switch the employer (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). Finally, older 
establishments have a higher probability to establish a reputation as a trustful employer, more 
likely offer pension schemes and better working conditions and therefore pay lower wages for 
a given quality of workers because workers prefer such conditions (Brown and Medoff 2003, 
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Jirjahn et al. 2009). Additionally, we check whether training or non-training firms poach 
apprenticeship graduates.  
Because our key hypotheses concern recruitment, it is also essential to control for a number of 
further determinants. An establishment recruits skilled workers either to replace workers who 
have quitted or been laid off or because of extending employment. Replacement is controlled 
for by the share of workers with an apprenticeship degree who leave the establishment on all 
workers on this skill level. Extending employment is calculated by the development of 
establishment-level workforce during the last 12 months. In addition, we extract numerous 
other control variables that previous research has identified as potential factors driving labour 
turnover (Capelli and Neumark 2004). We include firm size because larger organisations 
attract potential hires with better internal career opportunities, higher wages and may be more 
prone to offer better working conditions (Pfeffer and Cohen 1984, Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller 1999). Moreover, the composition of the workforce determines companies’ 
recruitment strategy. Unskilled workers, for example, have a higher unemployment rate and 
are therefore easier to hire than highly specialised skilled employees. We also include the 
education level of the workforce, whether the establishment is located in East Germany and 
industry dummies. 
 
Empirical Strategy: Our hypotheses posit a relationship between establishment-level 
recruitment strategies and the opportunity to retain apprenticeship graduates on internal 
labour market type contracts. We estimate the incidence of the dependent variables using a 
probit procedure with standard errors clustered at the establishment because some 
establishments might be observed several times in our data set. Then, we estimate the 
intensity of poaching using a Tobit procedure because a sizeable fraction of establishments 
does not hire employees with an apprenticeship degree because their profit-maximising 
choice between hiring own apprenticeship graduates, apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere and experienced skilled workers is at the corner of the decision space – hence we 
use a corner solution model to analyse this strategy.  
 
4.4. Results 
Table 4.1 presents the determinants of poached establishments. The dependent variable in the 
left column is the proportion of internal apprenticeship graduates on all new hires with an 
apprenticeship degree. This variable measures whether an establishment is able to meet its 
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demand of skilled labour through internal training. The right column presents regressions on 
the within-firm retention rate, defined as the proportion of retained apprenticeship graduates 
on all apprenticeship graduates. This variable measures the capability of training companies 
to keep their apprenticeship graduates. Both proportions show a strong association to internal 
labour market-type employment relations. 
 
Table 4.1: Determinants of Establishments which recruit apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere and establishments retaining apprenticeship graduates 
  Internal Recruitment   Within-Firm  
Retention Rate 
  Probit  Tobit   Probit   Tobit 
Works Council 0.5527  0.6589  0.1345  0.0123 
  (11.48)  (12.77)  (2.95)  (0.73) 
Collective Bargaining  0.1057  0.2158  0.0535  0.0208 
  (3.13)  (5.75)  (1.26)  (1.23) 
Above-Tariff Salary 0.1493  0.0778  0.1792  0.0354 
  (4.52)  (2.35)  (4.32)  (2.51) 
Old Establishment 0.2192)  0.1959  0.0777  0.0111 
  (5.68)  (4.71)  (1.66)  (0.59) 
Difference Experience and 
Tenure / 100 
-0.0002 
(10.84) 
 -0.0002 
(10.83) 
 -0.0114 
(6.35) 
 -0.0035 
(5.35) 
Number of Observations 16937 16937  9462  9462 
Pseudo R Square 0.3014  0.146   0.1674   0.0847 
T and Z-Values, respective, are given in parenthesis, complete regression output in table A2 and A3; standard 
errors are clustered on establishments; Source LIAB longitudinal version 2, 1999-2003.  
 
In detail, a signal of long-term commitment is the average difference between experience and 
tenure in an establishment. A number close to zero reveals a high share of workers that an 
establishment usually recruits at the beginning of their carrier. The coefficient shows that an 
establishment which recruits new workers with on average five years of experience has an 
18.6 percent higher probability to retain apprenticeship graduates than an establishment 
whose new recruits have on average 10 years of experience. Moreover, labour market 
institutions which signal long-tern commitment have a positive influence on the probability of 
internal recruitment and retaining apprenticeship graduates. In other words, training 
establishments which fail to offer a long-term perspective cannot attract a sufficient number 
of apprenticeship graduates. Moreover, establishments which are able to offer long-term 
employment relations are more likely able to cover their skill demand by own training efforts. 
Reputation seems to effectively prevent poaching in a wide sense.  
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We turn to the determinants of poaching. The determinants are measured with three 
dependent variables all of which differ in their numerator but have the same denominator, the 
number of new recruits which have an apprenticeship degree. The nominator of the first 
variable (left two columns in table 4.2) counts all new external recruits with an apprenticeship 
degree who get their first job after apprenticeship training. This is the broadest poaching 
definition. The second variable counts only those poached apprenticeship graduates who 
receive a wage above the market wage for the first job after the apprenticeship in an 
occupation. This variable defines poaching when the poaching establishment is willing to pay 
a wage above the market-level. The third variable tests the opposite direction and measures all 
new recruits who have changed their occupation for the first job. Switching occupation 
reveals a lower demand of occupation-specific skill.  
Table 4.2 shows that the difference between experience and tenure has only a small impact on 
the proportion of all newly recruited apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere but a much 
stronger on those apprenticeship graduates who receive a wage above the market wage for 
labour market entrants. An establishment, for example, with on average 5 years lower 
difference between experience and tenure has a 16 percent higher probability of hiring 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere. To the contrary, those establishments are less 
likely to hire occupational switchers. The other variables which usually signal an internal 
labour market show mixed results. 
Another interesting finding concerns the training establishment dummy. Training 
establishments more likely poach apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere than non-
training establishments. This may be based on two effects. On the one hand, training 
establishments may have different skill requirements than non-training establishments and, 
therefore, have a higher willingness to pay a high salary to effectively poach apprenticeship 
graduates. On the other hand, Sadowski (1980) discusses the “common training motivation”. 
Since training entails high fixed and low variable costs, training establishments train more 
apprentices than required so that a pool of skilled workers is available. Training 
establishments can hire these additional trainees when they face a higher demand of skilled 
workers than expected. Such an agreement can be enforced by employer associations which 
monitor apprenticeship training and may force establishments to participate in such a training 
scheme in a certain region and industry. However, this effect has to be analysed more in-
depth using different occupations for example – a key question is whether poaching for 
apprentices in occupations that require high investments is different from occupations with no 
net costs. 
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Table 4.2: Determinants of External Recruitments, Recruitments of Occupational Switchers 
and Recruitments above the Market Wage for Labour Market Entrants with an Apprenticeship 
Degree in a Given Occupation 
  External 
Recruitment 
  External Recruits 
with Wages Above 
Market Wage 
  External Recruits 
of Occupational 
Switchers 
  Probit   Tobit   Probit  Tobit   Probit   Tobit 
Training Company 0.5102  -0.2944  0.4289  0.4289  -0.2944  0.8263
  (12.70)  (9.32)  (9.68)  (9.68)  (9.32)  (10.96)
Works Council 0.2992  -0.0970  0.3202  0.3202  -0.0970  0.5804
  (8.48)  (3.04)  (8.28)  (8.28)  (3.04)  (11.03)
Collective Bargaining -0.0355  0.0331  -0.0449  -0.0449  0.0331  0.2380
  (1.10)  (1.35)  (1.22)  (1.22)  (1.35)  (6.31) 
Above-Tariff Salary -0.0252  0.0579  -0.0130  -0.0130  0.0579  0.0937
  (0.82)  (2.34)  (0.39)  (0.39)  (2.34)  (3.29) 
Old Establishment -0.0862  0.0232  -0.1632  -0.1632  0.0232  0.0178
  (2.52)  (0.87)  (4.29)  (4.29)  (0.87)  (0.47) 
Difference Experience 
and Tenure / 100 
0.0009 
(0.69) 
 -0.0088
(9.16) 
 0.0019 
(1.36) 
 0.0019 
(1.36) 
 -0.0088 
(9.16) 
 -0.0096
(6.56) 
Number of Obs. 16937  16937  16937  16937  16937  16937 
Pseudo R Square 0.1575   0.1088   0.1584  0.1584   0.1088   0.1521
T and Z-Values, respective, are given in parenthesis, complete regression output in appendix Table A4-A6.; 
standard errors are clustered on establishments; Source LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the determinants of poaching and poached 
establishments. We identify poaching and poached establishments using apprenticeship 
graduates in Germany. Apprenticeship graduates are a good basis for a poaching analysis 
because training is regulated in the Vocational Training Act and therefore the skills are 
observable by outsiders and transferable to other companies. We show that poached firms fail 
to credibly offer long-term contracts. Moreover, training firms more likely poach 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere than non-training firms. This may be an indicator 
for a segmented labour market where training and non-training companies recruit differently. 
These results shed new light on a series of theoretical poaching models. Training models 
define poaching when social returns exceed private ones. However, they assume that 
employees have full information about working conditions, career possibilities and their own 
ability compared to others at the start of the apprenticeship. When employees learn such 
information over the apprenticeship and prefer good working conditions and internal career 
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possibilities, employers who cannot offer such work places fail to attract apprenticeship 
graduates.  
The results require a more in-depth analysis. An analysis should take into account selectivity 
in apprenticeship training, time-invariant heterogeneity and simultaneity of the hiring and 
training decision. Moreover, varying the control group such as occupations that differ in their 
investment requirements for the training firm may also reveal new patterns. Apprenticeships 
in blue-collar occupations, for instance, require a higher investment and are considered to be 
more firm and occupation specific than white-collar occupations. Comparing both occupation 
groups may reveal additionally insights in the poaching behaviour of firms. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.A1: Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics (N=16937) 
Dependent Variables: Description (Mean, Standard Deviation) 
Within-Firm Retention Rate Proportion of retained apprenticeship graduates on all 
graduated apprenticeship graduates (0.5732, 0.3901) 
Internal Recruits Proportion of own apprenticeship graduates hired for skilled 
work on all newly hired workers with an apprenticeship 
certificate (0.2226, 0.7232) 
External Recruits Proportion of newly hired apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere (first job) on all newly hired workers with an 
apprenticeship certificate (0.0674, 0.2021) 
External Recruits with Wages 
Above the Market Wage 
Proportion of newly hired apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere (first job) with a wage above the market wage for 
labour market entrants on all newly hired workers with an 
apprenticeship certificate (0.1540, 0.5824) 
External Recruits of Occupational 
Switchers 
Proportion of newly hired apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere (first job) who switch the training occupation on 
all newly hired workers with an apprenticeship certificate 
Training Commitment:  
Apprenticeship Training Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment trains 
apprentices (0.7523, 0.4317) 
Reputation Measures:  
Difference Experience and Tenure  Average difference between experience and tenure, both 
measures start counting with the first job subjected to social 
insurance contribution after the apprenticeship (or 
internship for university graduates) (2252.87, 1338.32) 
Works Council Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment has a works 
council (0.4957, 0.4999) 
Above-Tariff Salary Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment pays above 
the collective agreement (0.3309, 0.4706) 
Collective Bargaining Agreement Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is covered 
by a collective bargaining agreement (0.6348, 0.4815) 
Old Establishment Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment was 
founded before 1989 (0.6619, 0.4730) 
Controls:  
Number of Employees Number of Employees (246,07, 826.68) 
Employment Development during 
the Last Year 
Percentage increase of the number of employees during the 
last year  
Leavers Proportion of employees with an apprenticeship degree who 
leave the establishment on all employees (0.0467, 0.0729) 
Apprentices Proportion of apprentices on all employees (0.06452, 
0.0918) 
Table continued next page  
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Table A1 continued  
Without Completed Apprenticeship 
and without Tertiary School Degree
Worker without completed apprenticeship and without 
tertiary school degree as a proportion of all employees 
(0.0795, 0.1242) 
With Completed Apprenticeship 
and without Tertiary School Degree
Workers with completed apprenticeship and without tertiary 
school degree as a proportion of all employees (0.6779, 
0.2049) 
University Degree Workers with a university or polytechnics degree as a 
proportion of all employees (0.0934, 0.1400) 
Part Time Workers Part-Time worker as a proportion of all employees (0.1233, 
0.1983) 
Foreigners Non-German workers as a proportion of all employees 
(0.0452, 0.0921) 
Females Female workers as a proportion of all employees (0.3969, 
0.3029)  
Single Site Company Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is a single 
site company (0.6703, 0.4701) 
East German Dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is located in 
East Germany (0.4333, 0.4955) 
Source LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Table 4.A2: Determinants of the Within-Firm Retention Rate 
 Probit   Tobit 
  Coef. T-Value  Coef. T-Value 
Works Council 0.1345 2.95  0.0123 0.73 
Collective Bargaining  0.0535 1.26  0.0208 1.23 
Above-Tariff Salary 0.1792 4.32  0.0354 2.51 
Old Establishment 0.0777 1.66  0.0111 0.59 
Difference Experience and Tenure / 
100 
-0.0001 -6.35  0.0000 -5.35 
Number of Employees 0.0026 4.22  0.0002 3.30 
Squared Number of Employees 0.0000 -10.87  0.0000 -5.60 
Employment Growth -0.0006 -1.11  -0.0001 -2.43 
Leavers -1.4191 -3.71  -0.7877 -4.27 
Apprentices -1.8350 -5.59  -1.1519 -8.83 
Without Completed Apprenticeship 
and without Tertiary School Degree 
-1.1075 -3.21  -0.2138 -1.76 
With Completed Apprenticeship and 
without Tertiary School Degree 
-0.8441 -2.87  -0.2178 -2.08 
University Degree -1.8782 -5.45  -0.5398 -4.14 
Part Time Workers -0.5794 -4.12  -0.3979 -3.13 
Foreigners -0.2328 -0.82  -0.2884 -4.94 
Females 0.2691 2.88  0.0947 0.96 
Single Site Company -0.0486 -1.15  0.0783 2.14 
East German -0.1645 -2.94  -0.0027 -0.20 
Constant 1.4227 4.72   -0.2106 -0.44 
Number of Observations 9462   9462  
Prob > F (chi sq) 0   .  
Pseudo Rsq 0.1674   0.0847  
Log Pseudolikelihood -4421.229     -7214.34   
Regressions include 6 industry and 3 year dummies and the share of workers with missing education; standard 
errors are clustered on establishments, reference category share of workers with tertiary school degree. Source: 
LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Table 4.A3: Determinants of recruited own apprenticeship graduates 
 Probit   Tobit 
  Coef. T-Value  Coef. T-Value 
Works Council 0.5527 11.48  0.6589 12.77 
Collective Bargaining  0.1057 3.13  0.2158 5.75 
Above-Tariff Salary 0.1493 4.52  0.0778 2.35 
Old Establishment 0.2192 5.68  0.1959 4.71 
Difference Experience and Tenure / 
100 
-0.0002 -10.84  -0.0002 -10.83 
Number of Employees 0.0019 2.83  0.0001 0.40 
Squared Number of Employees 0.0000 -6.98  0.0000 -6.92 
Employment Growth 0.0000 -0.02  0.0004 1.80 
Leavers -2.7701 -8.62  -3.7985 -9.15 
Apprentices 2.8994 11.54  3.0467 9.59 
Without Completed Apprenticeship 
and without Tertiary School Degree 
-1.0699 -4.99  -1.1826 -4.67 
With Completed Apprenticeship and 
without Tertiary School Degree 
-0.5938 -3.43  -0.6164 -2.82 
University Degree -1.1360 -5.36  -0.9354 -3.42 
Part Time Workers -0.4063 -3.98  -0.4476 -4.40 
Foreigners -0.4559 -2.28  -0.3684 -1.98 
Females 0.2003 2.75  0.0936 1.35 
Single Site Company -0.0132 -0.33  0.0012 0.03 
East German -0.2246 -4.86  -0.2281 -4.60 
Constant -0.0610 -0.33   -0.1395 -0.59 
Number of Observations 16937   16937  
Prob > F (chi sq) 0   0  
Pseudo Rsq 0.3014   0.146  
Log Pseudolikelihood -5932.708     -14188.63   
Regressions include 6 industry and 3 year dummies and the share of workers with missing education; standard 
errors are clustered on establishments, reference category share of workers with tertiary school degree. Source: 
LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Table 4.A4: Determinants of newly recruited apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere 
 Probit   Tobit 
  Coef. T-Value  Coef. T-Value 
Training Company 0.5102 12.70  0.1679 10.03 
Works Council 0.2992 8.48  0.1019 7.54 
Collective Bargaining  -0.0355 -1.10  0.0081 0.63 
Above-Tariff Salary -0.0252 -0.82  -0.0077 -0.64 
Old Establishment -0.0862 -2.52  -0.0375 -2.70 
Difference Experience and Tenure / 
100 
0.0000 0.69  0.0000 -2.28 
Number of Employees 0.0023 6.50  0.0002 6.36 
Squared Number of Employees 0.0000 -10.90  0.0000 -8.06 
Employment Growth -0.0011 -3.66  0.0000 -1.39 
Leavers 1.5694 8.13  0.2376 3.63 
Apprentices -0.5029 -2.33  -0.0627 -0.65 
Without Completed Apprenticeship 
and without Tertiary School Degree 
0.2215 1.16  0.0386 0.48 
With Completed Apprenticeship and 
without Tertiary School Degree 
0.0151 0.10  -0.0248 -0.35 
University Degree -1.0053 -5.22  -0.3534 -4.09 
Part Time Workers 0.0898 1.03  -0.0085 -0.26 
Foreigners 0.4898 3.05  0.0798 1.34 
Females 0.0664 1.01  0.0385 1.48 
Single Site Company -0.1254 -3.97  -0.0433 -3.78 
East German 0.0781 1.84  0.0045 0.27 
Constant -1.4563 -8.27   -0.5001 -6.23 
Number of Observations 16937   16937  
Prob > F (chi sq) 0   0  
Pseudo Rsq 0.1574   0.079  
Log Pseudolikelihood -8906.05     -8040.42   
Regressions include 6 industry and 3 year dummies and the share of workers with missing education; standard 
errors are clustered on establishments, reference category share of workers with tertiary school degree. Source: 
LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Table 4.A5: Determinants of newly recruited apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere who switched the occupation 
 Probit   Tobit 
  Coef. T-Value  Coef. T-Value 
Training Company 0.4289 9.68  0.1015 7.14 
Works Council 0.3202 8.28  0.0925 7.02 
Collective Bargaining  -0.0449 -1.22  -0.0017 -0.15 
Above-Tariff Salary -0.0130 -0.39  -0.0102 -0.99 
Old Establishment -0.1632 -4.29  -0.0462 -3.96 
Difference Experience and Tenure / 
100 
0.0000 1.36  0.0000 -0.47 
Number of Employees 0.0016 5.54  0.0002 4.95 
Squared Number of Employees 0.0000 -9.42  0.0000 -8.03 
Employment Growth -0.0008 -2.98  0.0000 -0.90 
Leavers 2.2582 10.54  0.4638 7.93 
Apprentices -1.2762 -4.47  -0.3651 -3.67 
Without Completed Apprenticeship 
and without Tertiary School Degree 
1.0833 5.17  0.2842 4.07 
With Completed Apprenticeship and 
without Tertiary School Degree 
0.1600 0.89  -0.0079 -0.12 
University Degree -0.5426 -2.51  -0.1664 -2.12 
Part Time Workers 0.1942 1.98  0.0432 1.49 
Foreigners 0.7360 4.25  0.1019 2.06 
Females -0.1766 -2.33  -0.0582 -2.51 
Single Site Company -0.1534 -4.50  -0.0380 -3.73 
East German 0.2195 4.55  0.0573 3.74 
Constant -2.1168 -10.44   -0.5953 -7.87 
Number of Observations 16937   16937  
Prob > F (chi sq) 0   0  
Pseudo Rsq 0.1584   0.1169  
Log Pseudolikelihood -7056.25     -5198.404   
Regressions include 6 industry and 3 year dummies and the share of workers with missing education; standard 
errors are clustered on establishments, reference category share of workers with tertiary school degree. Source: 
LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Table 4.A6: Determinants of newly recruited apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere with wages above the market wage for labour market entrance 
 Probit   Tobit 
  Coef. T-Value  Coef. T-Value 
Training Company -0.2944 -9.32  0.8263 10.96 
Works Council -0.0970 -3.04  0.5804 11.03 
Collective Bargaining  0.0331 1.35  0.2380 6.31 
Above-Tariff Salary 0.0579 2.34  0.0937 3.29 
Old Establishment 0.0232 0.87  0.0178 0.47 
Difference Experience and Tenure / 
100 
-0.0001 -9.16  -0.0001 -6.56 
Number of Employees 0.0023 7.71  0.0002 1.40 
Squared Number of Employees 0.0000 -12.40  0.0000 -6.58 
Employment Growth -0.0004 -1.02  0.0002 1.57 
Leavers -4.3972 -16.87  -0.0639 -0.30 
Apprentices 0.9873 6.42  0.0428 0.19 
Without Completed Apprenticeship 
and without Tertiary School Degree 
-0.6279 -4.30  -0.7381 -3.57 
With Completed Apprenticeship and 
without Tertiary School Degree 
-0.1441 -1.33  -0.3736 -2.03 
University Degree -0.1390 -1.06  -0.6473 -2.89 
Part Time Workers -0.1260 -1.98  -0.2351 -2.60 
Foreigners -0.1079 -0.85  0.3505 2.25 
Females 0.3162 6.85  -0.2185 -3.23 
Single Site Company 0.1264 4.55  -0.0766 -2.47 
East German -0.0817 -2.52  0.0989 2.25 
Constant 0.4273 3.52   -1.3532 -5.58 
Number of Observations 16937   16937  
Prob > F (chi sq) 0   0  
Pseudo Rsq 0.1088   0.1521  
Log Pseudolikelihood -14815     -12338.65   
Regressions include 6 industry and 3 year dummies and the share of workers with missing education; standard 
errors are clustered on establishments, reference category share of workers with tertiary school degree. Source: 
LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF 
APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING:  
THE PARTICULAR CASE OF WORKS COUNCILS 
 
Unpublished working paper together with Uschi Backes-Gellner and Paul Marginson 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A major challenge of economic policy measures remain the extension of apprenticeships 
when the demographic development increases the supply of apprentices. New apprenticeships 
can be created through additionally apprenticeships in training companies or through addi-
tionally training firms. Motivating firms to become involved in apprenticeship training re-
quires an institutional framework that allows training companies to benefit either in substitu-
tion or in investment motivated apprenticeship training. A key institution is the industrial rela-
tions system, in particular the works councils (Finegold and Soskice 1988, Soskice 1994, 
Backes-Gellner 1996, Ryan 2001, Culpepper 2003). Therefore, we can learn a lot about the 
creation of new apprenticeships by analysing the establishment of a works council. 
Early empirical papers about the establishment of works councils by Addison et al. (2003) 
and Dilger (2003) estimate determinants of newly established works councils but do not dis-
cuss why works councils are established. In contrast, Jirjahn (2009) discusses workers` moti-
vation for establishing a works council and argues that employees establish a works council to 
limit opportunistic behaviour of employers. Because opportunistic behaviour is more likely 
during economic downturns, Jirjahn (2009) and Kraft and Lang (2008) show that works 
councils are more likely introduced during economic downturns. Nevertheless, many uncov-
ered companies (e.g. without a works council) face economic downturns but only in a few 
firms establish a works council. Thus, an economic downturn may be a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for establishing a works council.  
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To understand the establishing process more in-depth, we extend previous studies in two di-
mensions. First, we examine specific events that motivate workers for establishing a works 
council. These events such as a change of the owner, a partial plant closure and a radical re-
structuring of the company occur more likely but not only during an economic downturn. Sec-
ond, we study the actor or agent who triggers the establishment of a works council. Establish-
ing a works council in conjunction with or against the will of the management reveals the 
managerial attitude and managerial response to worker representation. This paper analyses 
trigger events and agents with a detailed survey and test then the events on a national repre-
sentative dataset. 
In detail, the paper shows that a change of the owner increases the probability of establishing 
a works council. A new owner may mark a change in working conditions, leadership and 
compensation schemes of a plant. Workers who worked in the plant because working condi-
tions and leadership of the former owner fitted their preferences are now unsatisfied and will-
ing to establish a works council. Similar, a partial plant closure and a radical restructuring can 
indicate changing working conditions and can threat the security of workplaces, both of 
which trigger the establishment of a works council. In these situations, works councils are an 
instrument of risk protection. Works councils protect workers against the risk of employer 
opportunism, in particular, overcome information asymmetries, enforce implicit arrangements 
and enhance workers’ bargaining power. Furthermore, the panel design of our study shows a 
clear pattern of newly established works councils over the business cycle after controlling for 
organisational shocks. 
Moreover, previous studies assume, due to the lack of data, that workers alone establish the 
works council. Contrary, we have information about the initiator of the establishing process 
and we show that the management is involved in around one third of all cases and has in a 
minority of cases motivated workers to establish a works council. This finding allows differ-
entiations about the quality of intra-firm industrial relations, specifically managerial response 
which is considered as the most important factor in collective voice theory (Freeman and 
Medoff 1984, Bryson 2004, Addison 2009). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first, we present an overview of institu-
tions, discus motivations for establishing a works council, and derive our main hypotheses 
(section 2). Then, we describe our data and estimation strategy (section 3). Afterwards, we 
present our results on trigger agents and trigger events (section 4) and conclude and discuss 
generalisation of our results to other countries (section 5). 
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5.2 INSTITUTIONS, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Institutional Framework 
Works councils’ rights are laid down in the Works Constitution Act. Councils shall be elected 
by the workforces of establishments with five or more employees. Although their creation 
depends on the initiative of establishment’s employees, councils are not present in all eligible 
establishments. Works councils have full codetermination rights (participation or veto rights) 
on a set of issues, including introduction of new payment methods, overtime work, and the 
use of technical devices designed to monitor employee performance. They have weaker con-
sultation rights in matters such as changes in equipment and working methods that affect job 
requirements. Their information rights cover financial and economic matters (Hübler and Jir-
jahn 2003, Addison 2009). 
Even if only workers can establish a works council, case studies show that managers also 
sometimes motivate workers for establishing a works council, or that management and work-
ers cooperate for the establishment (Schlömer et al. 2007). Therefore, we discuss trigger 
events for establishing a works council for both agents the workforce and the management. 
Risk Protection as Workers Motivation 
For workers, works councils are an instrument to protect workers against employer opportun-
ism, in particular, break implicit contracts about compensation schemes, working conditions, 
fringe benefits, cooperative culture and leadership (Smith 1991, Freeman and Lazear 1995, 
Kaufman and Levine 2000, Jirjahn 2009). Implicit contracts are common in employment rela-
tions which are characterised by information asymmetries (Hogan 2001). Although implicit 
contracts are usually self-enforcing due to reputation mechanisms, employers and employees 
may cooperate initially but the employer may be tempted to renege on the promises made to 
the employees. Employers can behave opportunistically with respect to information, payment, 
employment and working conditions (Freeman and Lazear 1995, Ramey and Watson, 1997, 
Betrand 2004, Jirjahn 2009).  
Thus, each company offers jobs including an implicit contract about certain working condi-
tions, compensation schemes and a cooperative culture, arrangements which are neither con-
tractible nor enforceable and therefore implicit. When mangers announce lay-offs, cancel 
fringe benefits or increase work load, workers demand an institution that protects their inter-
ests. Works councils are an instrument for risk protection because works councils have legal 
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co-determination rights on personnel issues. These statutory rights reduce uncertainty and the 
risk of arbitrary management decisions so that works councils are an instrument to safeguard 
workers interests. Legal co-determination rights can discipline managers for breaking the im-
plicit contract.  
Managers may have reasonable arguments for cancelling the implicit contract, for instance, 
competition and innovation force a restructuring and the economic situation does not allow 
paying fringe benefits anymore. However, as long as workers cannot evaluate whether the 
economic situation requires such concessions by workers or whether managers only want to 
increase their rent share on workers costs (information asymmetry), workers will be inclined 
to establish a works council because works councils have legal access to information on fi-
nancial and economic matters.  
Furthermore, an owner change can trigger the establishment of a works council. A new owner 
can introduce a new cooperative culture, change compensation and working conditions but 
the conditions of the former owner fitted workers preferences so that workers resist those 
changes. The resentment can lead to the wish of legal co-determination which protects work-
ers interests. Works council provide workers with information, enforce implicit contracts by 
disciplining the firm for breaching the implicit contract and enhance workers’ bargaining 
power (Hogan 2001).  
These events or organisational shocks more likely causes the establishment of a works council 
because breaking implicit contracts constitutes an utility loss for workers, either an pecuniary 
or an non-pecuniary one. A sufficiently strong loss can motivate workers to call for action as 
behavioural economists have shown. Because workers value a potential loss higher as a simi-
lar gain conditioned to a certain reference point, this so called loss aversion more likely trig-
ger an action than a similar utility gain (Tversky and Kahneman 1991, Kahneman et al. 1991). 
In our case, customized working conditions are the reference point and a strong deterioration 
of working conditions is a reasonable trigger event that workers act and establish a works 
council.  
Worker demand risk protection when an implicit contract between management and work-
force requires renegotiations. Employers more likely break an implicit contract when an or-
ganisational shock such as a restructuring, plant closure and an owner change occur. Breaking 
the implicit contract result in deteriorate working conditions which mark an utility loss for 
workers and the loss can trigger the establishment of a works council by workers.  
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Solving the Commitment Problem as Managerial Motivation 
For managers, solving commitment problems is main advantage of works councils. Even if 
only workers can legally establish a works council, solving the commitment problem can be a 
motivation for managers to support the establishment. Commitment problems can arise in a 
variety of situations. Workers may withhold information about potentially performance-
enhancing innovations when they fear that the employer might use the information about in-
novations to their disadvantage such as intensify work load or job cuts (Jirjahn et al. 2009). 
Employees may refuse concessions even when those concessions may be necessary to over-
come a crisis of the establishment, if employees fear that the employer overstates the crisis to 
demand greater concessions (Jirjahn and Smith 2006).  
Works councils can solve commitment problems and create trustful employment relations and 
cooperation which enable a more effective communication and increase the legitimacy of 
management decisions (Hall et al. 2007). Thus, employees are willing to share their ideas for 
improving the efficiency of production. Further, works councils increase work satisfaction 
(Cornelissen et al. 2008) which lead to a reduction in quitting. A lower turnover suggests 
lower hiring and training costs and less disruption in the functioning of works groups. The 
likelihood that workers and firms remain together for a long period increase the incentive for 
investments in skills specific to the enterprise, which also raise productivity (Freeman and 
Medoff 1984).  
However, employee involvement gives workers a stronger bargaining position to renegotiate 
firm’s rents. Rent redistribution is the main reason that managers oppose the establishment of 
a works council, particularly when the expected increase of the rent share for the workforce 
offsets the expected increase in total rent (Freeman and Lazear 1995). Although works coun-
cils have no legal right to strike, it can still increase workers’ bargaining power using their 
veto rights or delaying decisions where participation and consultation rights prevail (Visser 
1995, Jirjahn et al. 2009). Moreover, management needs more time for preparing consulta-
tions and persuading works councillors (Hall et al. 2007). When the management expect that 
productivity enhancement, due to solving commitment problems, outweigh expected losses, 
due to rent redistribution and loss of control in decision making, they support or motivate 
workers for establishing a works council. 
 
5.3 DATA, METHODS AND VARIABLES 
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Empirical Strategy. We use two data sources to analyse events that trigger the establishment 
of a works council and the agent who trigger it. The IfM Bonn Works Council Survey allows 
in-depth descriptions of the establishing process regarding the trigger event and the agent but 
does not include questions about organisational shocks for firms that did not establish a works 
council and does not include a time dimension. Therefore, we turn to the IAB Establishment 
Panel and estimate the influence of an organisational shock on the probability of establishing 
a works council. 
Data-Sets. The IfM Bonn Works Council Survey is a unique cross-section dataset about co-
determination in small- and medium-sized companies in Germany. The unique feature of this 
survey is a set of questions about the establishment of a works council. All companies cov-
ered by a works council report the trigger event, trigger agent and year of establishment. The 
dataset is representative of companies with 20 to 500 employees and was collected by the 
Small and Medium Size Enterprise Research Institute in 2005 (Institut für Mittelstandsfor-
schung – IfM, for a detailed data description see Schlömer et al. 2007). Because the survey 
was collected in 2005, several years after most works council were established, we drop all 
companies where the manager reports that he or she cannot remember or was not in charge at 
the time of establishment. Further, we restrict the sample on companies that established their 
works council between 2001 and 2005. We draw this sub-sample because these companies 
also report the number of employees at the time of establishment, which is necessary for sub-
sequent regression analyses. This yields a sample of 60 companies that established a works 
council between 2001 and 2005.  
The IAB Establishment Panel is a representative survey based on a stratified random sample 
from the population of all German establishments. We use the waves 1999-2007 of this panel 
in which information about works council status, organisational shocks, and other firm char-
acteristics for each company are available (for data description see Jacobebbinghaus 2008). 
We drop non- profit companies, agriculture firms, all companies with more than one change 
in their works council status and all companies that switch from having to not having a works 
council. Further, we drop all firms with less than 5 employees because of the legal threshold 
for establishing a works council. 
We use the IfM Bonn Works Council Survey for detailed descriptive analyses and the IAB 
Establishment Panel for our main regressions so that we derive our variables for the latter 
dataset. 
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Dependent Variable: We identify all firms which do not have a works council in the last but 
report to be covered by a works council in the following year as newly established works 
councils. The probability of establishing a works council for a random uncovered company is 
around 1 percent. Even if the establishment of a works council is a rare event, we identify 273 
newly established works councils in the IAB Establishment Panel. The control group contains 
all establishments that have not established a works council between two observation periods. 
Table 5.A2 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics of newly established works councils. 
Explanatory Variables: Several variables capture the trigger events based on risk protection. 
First, we define a set of dummy variables for organisational shocks that directly influence the 
security of workplaces, such as a partial plant closure, an outsourcing and a spin-off of a part 
of the establishment. These, relatively rare events, threaten the workplace security as a part of 
the implicit contract and therefore should have a strong incentive for workers to establish a 
works council. Second, a radical reorganisation breaks the implicit contract between workers 
and management when it entails job-cuts and worsens working conditions.  
Third, an owner change can threat the implicit contract when new owners change working 
conditions but workers stay in the firm because working conditions under the old owner fitted 
their preferences. Moreover, new owners may cut fringe benefits so that workers suspect los-
ing the rents which they have created with their effort. We define an owner change when a 
company was a single site company in the last year and is a branch of a bigger company next 
year.  
Additionally to these trigger events, we check determinants of establishing a works council 
which are used in previous studies. A bad economic perspective lowers profits and can force 
managers for announcing wage-cuts and urging workers to increase their effort, all of which 
threaten the implicit contract (Jirjahn 2009). Similar to Kraft and Lang (2008) and Jirjahn 
(2009) we use the establishment-level employment growth as indicator for a establishment-
level indicator for a bad economic situation defines as the percentage increase or decrease to 
last year employees. Additionally, the panel design additionally allows a variable measuring 
the deviation from the mean growth for each sector and year. This variable enables the meas-
urement of the establishment of works councils over the business cycle. A negative deviation 
from the sectoral mean growth in a particular year should be correlated with a higher prob-
ability of establishing a works council. Note, the deviation from sectoral mean growth is in-
dependent of establishment-level trigger events that can occur in good as well as in bad times. 
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Control Variables. In addition to our variables of key interest, we control for other variables 
that determine the establishment of a works council (Addision et al. 2003, Dilger 2003, Kraft 
and Lang 2008, Jirjahn 2009). Firm size may have a positive influence on establishing a 
works council. The number of employees indicates a more complex and hierarchical organisa-
tion, where councils mitigate transaction costs. Moreover, the legal rights of works councils 
are stronger in larger firms and the stronger rights might increase workers’ incentive for es-
tablishing a works council (Jirjahn 2009). Furthermore, we include several variables for the 
composition of the workforce and take into account that different types of workers may differ 
in their taste for representation. Skilled Workers may more likely establish a works council 
because their firm-specific human-capital investments are threatened by a job loss. In con-
trast, works councils face difficulties in effectively representing part-time employees (Jirjahn 
and Smith 2006).  
Further, variables that influence the coverage of works councils can also influence the estab-
lishment, for example East-German firms tend to have a lower probability of coverage and 
older establishments a higher (Zwick 2004). Moreover, we include a dummy for payment 
above the collective agreement and the presence of a collective bargaining agreement. Hübler 
and Jirjahn (2003) show that collective bargaining coverage discourages workers from adopt-
ing a council because it limits the scope for establishment-level bargaining. Accordingly, 
companies switching to collective bargaining might discourage workers for establishing a 
works council. Furthermore, export oriented firms, as a common proxy for international com-
petitiveness, and firms with higher investments per capita, a common proxy for capital stock, 
usually have higher human capital investments which make earning losses bigger when leav-
ing the company (Zwick 2004). Moreover, the legal form and the ownership status of an es-
tablishment may have an influence on the probability that the management break the implicit 
contract (Jirjahn 2009).  
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5.4 FINDINGS 
Using the IfM Bonn works council survey, we present descriptive evidence about specific 
trigger events for establishing a works council. Then, we present the agents who triggered the 
establishment and examine correlations between both. Afterwards, we turn to the IAB Estab-
lishment Panel and analyse the role of these trigger events on the probability of establishing a 
works council comparing firms that have established a works council with firms that have not. 
Trigger events 
The IfM Bonn Works Council Survey asks managers about specific events which triggered 
the establishment of their works council. Managers report that organisational shocks are a 
relevant trigger in 43 percent (table 5.1). The most important organisational shock is a change 
of the owner (32 percent).1 Thus, workers seem to consider a new owner as a menace to the 
implicit contract. Workers, for instance, suspect that new owners cut fringe benefits, change 
working conditions and prefer a new management style whereby the style and conditions of 
the former owner fitted workers’ preferences. 
Moreover, requiring risk protection is much more obvious when an organisational shock 
threatens the security of workplaces, for instance, when mangers announce a radical reorgani-
sation, or a partial plant closure. Thus, workers have an even stronger incentive for establish-
ing a works council. These events naturally happen seldom but are frequently identified as 
trigger events. A partial plant closure triggers the establishment of a works council in 3 per-
cent and a radical restructuring in 15 percent of all cases. 2  
Workers are willing to protect their interests, in particular, enforce an implicit contract and 
reduce information asymmetries, when an organisational shock occurs or the owner changes. 
Contrary, the second category “workers voice” (68 percent) cannot unambiguously be as-
signed to one motivation. For example, the category “conflicts between management and 
workers” (10 percent) can either result from risk protection spurred by something like man-
agement’s plan for cancelling fringe benefits or from workers strategy for enhancing workers 
rent-share. A similar argument holds true for the category “workers want more codetermina-
tion” (18 percent) and “the management know no reason why workers established a works 
council” (27 percent). In contrast, the last category “new workers with works council experi-
                                              
1 A change of the owner is more widely defined as in the IAB Establishment Panel and comprise every change 
of the ownership. 
2 The percentage of each category do not equals the sum of the sub-categories because multiple answers were 
possible and some respondents identified two sub-categories as trigger events. 
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ence” means that newly hired employees, who worked in a company covered by a works 
council before, convinced the co-workers to establish a works council (13 percent). This cate-
gory describes a network effect where the idea of co-determination spreads to other estab-
lishments in a certain region and industry. This idea is frequently used to instrument works 
councils in studies of economic effects of works councils (Mueller 2009). 
 
Table 5.1: The Trigger Event for Establishing a Works Council3  
   Observation Percent 
Organisational 
Shock  26 43.33 
 New Owner 19 31.66 
 Partial Plant Closure 2 3.33 
 Radical Reorganisation 9 15.00 
Workers Voice  35 58.33 
 Conflicts between Management 
and the Workforce 6 10.00 
 Workers want More Co-
Determination 11 18.33 
 New Workers with Works 
Council Experience 8 13.33 
 Management Knows no Reason 16 26.66 
Managerial  
Communication  13 21.66 
 Improve Productivity 8 13.33 
 Improve Motivation 3 5.00 
 Need a Fixed Representative 8 13.33 
Sample restriction: 60 companies that have established a works council between 2001 and 2005, answers were 
given by the managers and multiple answers were possible, source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
 
The third category, managerial communication (32 percent), refers to answers where the man-
agement is explicitly named to be involved in the establishing process. The first category 
“management demand a fixed representative” (13 percent) suggests that managers demand 
council’s mediation role. Council’s mediation role avoids transaction costs and solves com-
mitment problems. These reasons may play also a role in the second and third categories 
                                              
3 The classification in the three groups: managerial communication, workers voice and organisational shock, is 
based on logical connection, if the management was named in the question or if an organisational shock was 
asked. This classification cannot be obtained by a factor analyses because the most respondents tick only 
one possible answer and therefore a factor analyses can only be based on a minor sub-sample. 
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“managers want to improve productivity and motivation” (13 and 5 percent, respectively). 
These categories additionally refer the argument that works councils enhance the size of the 
enterprise pie.  
In addition, the questionnaire allows multiple answers and one third of the respondents ticked 
more than one trigger event. For example, 14 of the 35 respondents of “workers voice” also 
identify the organisational shock of a “new owner” as a specific trigger event. In these cases, 
an owner change leads also to conflicts between management and workers or the new owner 
don’t know why the workers establish a works council after the owner change. Such multiple 
answers support the idea that risk protection spurred from enforcing the implicit contract is a 
prevalent trigger. Otherwise, the productivity enhancement argument of works councils seems 
to be a relevant trigger in a minor of cases.  
Trigger agent 
Our data additionally allow identifying trigger agents which give a more comprehensive in-
sight into the establishing process. Even though only workers can formally establish a works 
council, managers can support the establishment of a works council. Then, intra-
establishment conflicts may be less likely and, therefore, positive effects of works councils 
are more likely. Managers are involved in the establishment of works councils in about one 
third of cases. In these companies, managers actively want to moderate an intra-firm indus-
trial relations change, once workers show interest in establishment-level codetermination. 
Furthermore, management itself encourages workers to establish a works council in approxi-
mately 7 percent of all cases. Management motivations for establishing worker representation 
are described in a case study by Schlömer et al. (2007). They cite a manager who knows posi-
tive effects of a works council from his previous job, particularly the mediation role of works 
councillors. To take advantage of worker representatives, he motivates the workforce to es-
tablish a works council in his new company. Nevertheless, workers alone trigger the estab-
lishment in the majority of all cases. Our results show that both, workforce alone and work-
force in conjunction with management are prevalent initiators of council establishment. 
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Table 5.2: The Trigger Agent for Establishing a Works Council 
  Observations Percent  
Workforce Alone 37 61.67 
Management Involved 19 31.67 
Management Motivated 4 6.67 
Sample restriction: 60 companies that have established a works council between 2001 and 2005, answers were 
given by managers; Source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005. 
 
We can also calculate descriptive statistics on the trigger events and agents for the entire sam-
ple, but the retrospective nature of the questions may cause recall problems for respondents 
and bias the results. For instance, we can show that the number of firms where managers was 
involved in the establishment process or have motivated workers to establish the works coun-
cil significantly increase when the time-span between establishment of the works council and 
survey increases. This finding may be a tribute to good employment relations in those compa-
nies, where managers cannot imagine that they oppose employee representation.4  
 
Table 5.3: Cross-Tabulation of Trigger Agent and Event Establishing a Works Council 
    trigger event   
  Organisational Shock Workers Voice Managerial  Communication 
Workforce Alone 18 0.42 25 0.58 0 0.00
  0.70   0.72   0.00  
Management Involved 7 0.26 10 0.37 10 0.37
  0.27   0.28   0.77  
1 0.25 0 0.00 3 0.75
tri
gg
er
 a
ge
nt
 
Management Moti-
vated  0.03   0.00   0.23  
The trigger event question allowed for multiple answers; in each cell: top left = the number of cases; top right = 
the percentages of trigger agents (row); bottom left = the percentages of trigger events (column). Sample restric-
tion: 60 companies that have established a works council between 2001 and 2005. Source: IfM Bonn Works 
Council Survey 2005. 
                                              
4 Accordingly, Schlömer et al. (2007) cite managers who state, “if works councils do not exist, they have to be 
invented.” 
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Associations between trigger event and trigger agent 
In addition, we examine associations between trigger events and agents. Table 5.3 shows that 
workers alone more likely establish a works council if an organisational shock occurs and 
workers want more voice. Contrary, table 5.3 confirms that managerial involvement is associ-
ated with management demand a fixed representative and wants to improve productivity and 
motivation. 
 
Table 5.4: Relation between Trigger Agent and Trigger Event, Marginal Effects after Probit. 
  Coef. Z-Value Coef. Z-Value Coef. Z-Value 
Dummy: Organisational Shock  0.3913 2.41 ** 0.4773 2.66 ** 
Dummy: Workers Voice  0.5344 3.12 ** 0.4384 2.26 ** 
Managerial Attitude towards Em-
ployee Representation 
  -0.3230 2.97 ***
Number of Employees 0.0042 1.74 * 0.0053 2.05 ** 0.0040 1.45  
Squared Number of Employ-
ees/1000 
-0.0089 1.60  -0.0114 1.92 * 0.0000 1.13  
Dummy: Owner-Manager 0.2742 1.66 * 0.2510 1.36  0.2524 1.29  
Dummy: Single Site Company 0.0119 0.08  0.0651 0.38  0.1399 0.78  
Dummy: Located in East Germany 0.1809 1.14  0.1594 0.96  0.2467 1.57  
Industry Dummies yes  yes  yes  
Number of Establishments 60  60  60  
LR chi(2) 8.13  20.54  33.57  
Pseudo R² 0.1018  0.2571  0.4202  
Log Likelihood -35.87    -29.66    -23.15    
Dependent Variable: One: Workforce Alone Triggers the Establishment of Works Council, Zero: Managerial 
Involvement during the Establishing Process. Sample restriction: companies that established a works council 
between 2001 and 2005; *, **, *** significant on the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively. Source: IfM Bonn 
Works Council Survey 2005. 
 
Further, we validate these correlations using a multivariate framework, whereby we control 
for additionally variables which also influence the probability that workers alone establish a 
works council.5 Table 5.4 shows the marginal effects after Probit and supports the descriptive 
findings. The variables of primary interest, an organisational shock and voice requirements, 
increase the probability that workers alone establish of a works council. An organisational 
shock increases this probability by 48 percent when we control for managerial attitude to-
wards employee participation at the time of establishment (column 3). Further, a positive 
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managerial attitude decreases the probability that workforce alone calls for election, in other 
words, the management is involved in the establishment process. However, managerial atti-
tude is obvious or highly endogenous and should cautiously be interpreted. Nevertheless, this 
result supports the importance of cooperative culture and leadership when evaluating voice 
regimes (Bryson 2004). All other variables are insignificant when we control for managerial 
attitude towards employee representation at the time of establishment.  
The IfM Bonn works council survey directly asked managers of establishments that have in-
troduced a works council about the trigger event. Unfortunately, this data set includes no in-
formation about a change of the owner or a restructuring in establishments that have not in-
troduced a works council. Thus, we turn to the IAB Establishment Panel and analyses the 
relevance of these trigger events comparing establishments that have introduced a works 
council and that one that have not. 
Trigger Events: Comparison to Uncovered Companies 
The IAB Establishment Panel defines the trigger events slightly different. First, the data entail 
an additional categories, outsourcing, insourcing and spin-off. Second, the definition of the 
reorganisation differs so that we can only identify when a reorganisation occurs rather than a 
radical one. Therefore, a larger proportion of establishments should report such reorganisation 
and that’s why we expect a lower probability of establishing a works council. Third, the data 
only allow an indirect measure of an new owner. We define an owner change when a firm 
was a single site company in the last year and is now a branch of a company. Note, this defi-
nition captures only a part of owner changes of the IfM Bonn Works Council survey. Addi-
tionally, we measure the employment growth which is identified in previous studies as a 
prevalent trigger and the deviation from sectoral GDP growth in the previous year which 
shows the development of newly established works councils over the business cycle. 
Table 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics of the trigger events in the IAB Establishment 
Panel. Each organisational shock more frequently occurs in establishments with newly estab-
lished works councils than in an establishment without one. For instance, reorganisations oc-
cur in 13 percent of all non-treated establishments but in 25 percent of the treated. Otherwise, 
partial plant closures are seldom but also happen 4.5 times more often in establishments with 
newly established works councils. Furthermore, works councils are more frequent established 
                                                                                                                                             
5 The definition of all control variables are shown in appendix table 5.A3. All variables are collected in 2005. 
However, managerial attitude towards employee representation and the establishment size at the time estab-
lishment are specifically asked. All other used variables are assumed to be constant over time.  
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when the sectoral growth in the preceding year was 0.53 percentage points lower than aver-
age. 
Table 5.5: Frequents of Trigger Events (IAB Establishment Panel) 
  No Works  
Council 
Newly Established 
Works Council 
Organisational Shock 0.2339 0.3919 
Partial Plant Closure 0.0150 0.0147 
Spin-off of a Part of the Establishment 0.0089 0.0403 
Outsourcing of a Part of the Establishment 0.0049 0.0110 
Deviation from Sectoral Growth 0.0266 -0.5345 
Integration of Another Establishment 0.0220 0.0549 
New Owner 0.0097 0.0293 
Reorganisation 0.1347 0.2527 
Variables measure if an organisational shock occurs during the last year. Definition of all variables is in Table 
5.A2 in appendix. Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1999-2007. 
 
Table 5.6: Marginal Effects after Probit Regression of the Probability of Establishing a 
Works Council 
  Coef. Z-Value  Coef. Z-Value 
Organisational Shock 0.0026 3.12 0.0035 3.13 
Deviation from Sectoral Growth  -0.0010 4.41 
Employment Growth  -0.0064 0.67 -0.0076 0.61 
Number of Employees / 1000   0.0165 4.71 0.0210 4.42 
Squared Numb. of Employees/1000  -0.0025 2.56 -0.0032 2.26 
Share of Skilled Workers  -0.0004 0.28 -0.0018 0.94 
Share of Apprentices  -0.0020 0.55 -0.0038 0.77 
Share of Part-time Workers  -0.0035 1.85 -0.0057 2.24 
Export share  -0.0000 0.28 0.0000 0.65 
log(Investment per Capita)  -0.0001 1.01 -0.0001 0.98 
Collective Agreement   0.0045 5.01 0.0059 4.82 
Wages above Collective Level   0.0004 0.42 0.0009 0.78 
Old Establishment  -0.0017 1.93 -0.0020 1.68 
Bad Economic Situation  -0.0001 0.15 0.0001 0.06 
East German Establishment  -0.0026 3.17 -0.0027 2.43 
Single Site Company  -0.0040 2.88 -0.0052 2.83 
Limited Company   0.0032 2.68 0.0041 2.57 
Foreign Owned Company   0.0056 2.54  0.0069 2.47 
Number of Observations 25367   25367  
Prob > chi2 0.0000   0.0000  
Pseudo R2 0.1285    0.0860   
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Dependent Variable: One = newly established works council, zero = no works council. Include industry dum-
mies. Standard Errors are clustered on Establishment. Marginal effects are calculated on the mean of the de-
pendent variable. Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1999-2007 
 
Table 5.6 presents the marginal effects of the determinants of establishing a works council 
after Probit. The occurrence of an organisational shock has a significant positive effect on the 
probability of establishing a works council. The marginal effect is 0.35 percent on all uncov-
ered companies. This effect has to be compared with the probability of establishing a works 
council of 1.07 percent which yield an influence of more than one third.  
 
Table 5.7: Probit Regression of the Probability of Establishing a Works Council  
  Coef. Z-Value  Coef. Z-Value
Partial Plant Closure -0.0017 0.78  -0.0026 0.85 
Spin-off of a Part of the Establishment 0.0173 3.78  0.0181 3.46 
Outsourcing of a Part of the Establishment 0.0031 0.67  0.0045 0.71 
Deviation from Sectoral Growth    -0.0010 4.40 
Integration of Another Establishment 0.0046 1.98  0.0062 2.06 
New Owner 0.0029 1.00  0.0065 1.52 
Reorganisation 0.0023 2.30  0.0030 2.29 
Employment Growth -0.0046 0.56   -0.0068 0.59 
Number of Observations 25367   25367  
Prob > chi2 0.0000   0.0000  
Pseudo R2 0.1334    0.0907  
Dependent Variable: One = newly established works council, zero = no works council. The same control vari-
ables used as in table 5.6. Standard Errors are clustered on Establishment. Marginal effects are calculated on the 
mean of the dependent variable. Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1999-2007 
 
Further, we separate the organisational shock in 6 categories (table 5.7). The shocks a spin-off 
of a part of the establishment, an integration of another establishment and a reorganisation 
have a positive impact on the probability of establishing a works council. Contrary a partial 
plant closure and an outsourcing of a part of the company have no significant effect but both 
shocks occur very seldom. Similar, a new owner has no influence on the establishment of a 
works council but we should note that we can only indirectly measure a change of the owner 
in the IAB Establishment Panel and therefore, this bias can drive the insignificance. However, 
our results demonstrate that organisational shocks have indeed an influence on the probability 
of establishing a works council.  
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Figure 5.1: Number of Newly Established Works Councils and the Business Cycle 
 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1999-2007 (own calculations), Federal Office of Statistics. 
 
Furthermore, breaking the implicit contract cannot only result from specific organisational 
shock events but also a worse economic situation may force managers to cut fringe benefits or 
to claim higher efforts from workers. This source of breaking the implicit contract captures 
the deviation from the sectoral growth rate. Deviation from average sectoral growth preceding 
council’s establishment has a significant negative impact on the probability of establishing a 
works council. This measure takes into account a different economic growth between indus-
tries whereby the average sectoral growth is the reference point. A negative deviation means 
that the sectoral growth rate is lower than the average of the sector during the last years and 
vice versa a positive deviation represents a higher. A one percent lower growth in the previ-
ous year increases the probability of establishing a works council of about 0.1 percent. Figure 
5.1 underpins this interpretation. In figure 5.1, we plot the yearly number of newly established 
works councils and the previous year GDP growth. A higher GDP growth in the previous year 
is associated with a lower number of newly established works councils and vice versa.6  
Works councils are more likely established during economic recessions than during boom 
periods after controlling for explicit organisational shocks. Thus, the risk protection strategy 
of workers is a motivation for establishing a works council. 
                                              
6 We get a similar figure when we plot the year dummies against the number of newly established works coun-
cils. 
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Figure 5.2: Newly Established Works Council over Firm Size, Unconditioned Locally 
Weighted Regression 
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Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1999-2007. Note: The firm-size range is restricted to 500 employees because 
we observe too few bigger companies which have newly established a works council and therefore this estimator 
would not appropriate fit the extended firm size range. 
 
The control variables have the expected signs. The firm size shows a positive concave shape. 
A larger number of employees indicate a more complex and hierarchical organisation in 
which a higher need of communication increase works council’s benefits such as mitigate 
transaction costs. The finding shows, furthermore, that the increasing coverage of works 
councils by firm size stems not only from the fact that establishments with a works councils 
grow but also that larger uncovered firms more likely establish a works council. This relation 
illustrates figure 5.2. The probability of establishing a works council increases from less than 
a half percent in smallest eligible companies up to around 6 percent in companies of around 
500 employees. Thus, larger firms have a higher probability of having a works council and 
the remaining uncovered firms have a higher probability of establishing a works council.  
Furthermore, the proportion of part-time workers has a negative impact on the probability of 
establishing a works council which confirms recent findings that councils face difficulties in 
effectively representing part-time employees. Moreover, firms covered by a collective agree-
ment more likely establish a works council. Furthermore, limited companies have a positive 
and single site companies a negative influence on the probability of establishment. Single site 
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companies may better reflect workers interests than multi-site companies because mangers of 
multi-site companies have to consider different plants. Moreover, foreign owned firms have a 
higher probability of establishing a works council as foreign leadership leads to a higher wish 
of legal codetermination. Further, East German companies have a higher probability of estab-
lishing a works council. This indicates a convergence of industrial relations in both parts of 
Germany because the incidence of works councils in East Germany is smaller but the prob-
ability of establishing works councils is higher than in West Germany. Further, the export 
share on total sales and the investments have no influence. 
Robustness Checks 
We run a series of robustness checks for the estimations of the trigger events using the IAB 
Establishment Panel. First, we test the influence of all key explanatory variables alone. Sec-
ond, we repeat the estimation for West Germany only. Both tests confirm our findings. Third, 
we exclude the reorganisation dummy because this variable has the highest weight in the or-
ganisation shock and, more important, was not regularly asked in the IAB Establishment 
Panel. Even if reorganisations are not regularly asked, the construction of this question allows 
interpolation to previous years. Nevertheless, this measure may not be as precise as the oth-
ers. Therefore, we run all regressions without the reorganisation dummy and get qualitative 
and quantitative similar results for the key variables.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
This paper presents evidence for trigger events and associated agents of establishing a works 
council. We show that a change of the owner and organisational changes such as integration 
of another plant, a spin-off and restructuring lead to a higher probability of establishing a 
works council. These results show that workers demand works councils as an instrument of 
risk protection against deteriorate working conditions and to safeguard workplaces. More-
over, these trigger events specify recent findings that financial distress and declining em-
ployment causes the establishing of a works council because organisational shocks can occur 
in good and on bad times. However, sector-wide economic downturn still has an effect on the 
probability of establishing a works council.  
Moreover, we show that while workforce alone is the most frequent trigger agent in about two 
thirds of all cases, management is involved in the other third and has in a minority of cases 
motivated workers to establish a works council. When managers are involved in the establish-
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ing process, intra-firm industrial relations may be less conflicting during and after the estab-
lishing of a works council. 
Our findings are also relevant for other countries of the European Economic Area (EEA), 
which following adoption of the EU’s 2002 Information and Consultation of Employees Di-
rective (ICE), are now all required to have provisions for the establishment of representative 
structures for employee information and consultation within national undertakings i.e. at 
workplace and/or company level. The rights specified in the Directive differ from the German 
Works Constitution Act, which provides more robust rights on the timing and quality of in-
formation provision, a more rigorous definition of consultation and, in addition, co-
determination  rights on a range of issues which in effect provide works councils with veto 
rights on personnel matters. These differences are likely to dilute the extent of the risk protec-
tion provided by national legislation introduced under the Directive as compared to Germany, 
and hence the incentive for workforces to seek the establishment of works council-type ar-
rangements. Moreover, the Directive also provides considerable leeway for individual mem-
ber states in framing their implementing national legislation (Carley and Hall 2008).  
How far the findings of the present study are relevant to other EEA countries can be consid-
ered along two dimensions. The first is the robustness of information and consultation rights. 
Under Austrian and Dutch legislation, for example, these are equivalent to those specified in 
Germany. The same broadly applies to the rights of local trade organisations within compa-
nies under the basic agreements which govern industrial relations in the Nordic countries. In 
France and Spain, however, statutory consultation rights are weaker than in Germany – hence 
the rent protection incentive for workforce is reduced. In the UK and Ireland, where universal 
rights to employee information and consultation were unknown until the coming into force of 
national legislation implementing the EU directive (Hall 2006), the recent legislation’s infor-
mation rights are less precisely specified than in continental Western and Nordic Europe and 
consultation rights are weaker. Moreover, framing of the UK regulations leaves open the pos-
sibility for management and workforce representatives to negotiate ‘private’ arrangements 
outside of the formal procedures of the UK legislation. These so-called ‘pre-existing’ agree-
ments (Hall, 2006) do not necessarily have to meet the information and consultation standards 
specified in the UK legislation. Nonetheless, even in the UK and Ireland, the weaker consulta-
tion rights do not necessarily impinge on the potential for obtaining credible information 
about economic situation which are necessary to overcome the information asymmetries after 
an organisational shock. Therefore, a works council basing on the ICE Directive can also be 
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an instrument for risk protection, for example, when the management cancel implicit contracts 
about fringe benefits or working conditions. Indeed, weaker co-determination rights may re-
sult in a weaker incentive for workforces to trigger the establishment of a works council. In 
other countries, management might be a relatively more prominent trigger agent in establish-
ing a works council (cf. Hall et al. 2007 for the UK). Management incentives for promoting 
the establishment of works council-type arrangements are likely to be less impacted by these 
differences. Hence, in countries such as the UK and Ireland, management appears to be a rela-
tively more prominent trigger agent (Hall et al. 2007).  
The second dimension is the extent to which rights to information and consultation, and the 
corresponding works council-type structures, are well established and hence the likely costs 
and benefits well known to management and workers. In countries such as Germany, where 
the current legal framework has essentially been in place for more than half a century, then an 
equilibrium situation prevails. In contrast, where information and consultation rights have 
only recently been introduced, as in the UK, and a situation of transition prevails, both man-
agement and workforces have greater uncertainty about the potential costs and benefits in-
volved. Equilibrium means here especially that, on the one hand, workers and managers are 
aware of works councils’ statutory rights. These rights are taught in Germany, for example, 
during the apprenticeship where two thirds of a birth cohort is trained. On the other, unions 
see works councils as a complementary industrial relation institution in Germany and this 
mutual recognition evolved over a long period accompanied by an intensive conflict (Muel-
ler-Jentsch 1995). Nevertheless, the role of works councils in a historic developed country 
specific system of industrial relations is hard to predict and therefore country specific institu-
tions do not allow a direct application of our results.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 5.A1: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample of the IAB Establishment Panel. 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables:     
Dummy: Newly Established Works 
Council 0.0108 0.1032 0 1 
Explanatory Variables:     
Dummy: Organisational Shock 0.2339 0.4233 0 1 
Partly Plant Closure 0.0150 0.1216 0 1 
Spin-off of a Part of the Establish-
ment 0.0089 0.0942 0 1 
Outsourcing of a Part of the Estab-
lishment 0.0049 0.0697 0 1 
Deviation from Sectoral Growth 0.0266 2.1829 -4.806 5.054001 
Integration of Another Establish-
ment 0.0220 0.1467 0 1 
New Owner 0.0097 0.0980 0 1 
Reorganisation 0.1347 0.3414 0 1 
Employment Growth 0.0024 0.0304 -0.1467 0.9677 
Employee Characteristics:     
Share of Apprentices 0.0616 0.0920 0 1 
Share of Unskilled Workers 0.1954    
Share of Skilled Workers 0.7431 0.2593 0 1 
Share of Part Time Workers 0.1790 0.2281 0 1 
Establishment Characteristics:     
Number of Employees 38.6437 106.3574 6 5982 
Dummy: Collective Barg. Contract 0.3935 0.4885 0 1 
Dummy: Payment above Collective 
Level 0.2772 0.4476 0 1 
Dummy: Establishment founded 
before 1989 0.7405 0.4384 0 1 
Prospering profit situation 0.3067 0.4611 0 1 
East German Establishment 0.4507 0.4976 0 1 
Export share 4.7478 14.4786 0 100 
Log(Investment per Capita) 5.0279 3.7946 0 13.66 
Dummy: Limited Company 0.5906 0.4917 0 1 
Dummy: Foreign Owned Company 0.0268 0.1614 0 1 
Dummy: Single Side Company 0.3064 0.4610 0 1 
Distribution by Industry:     
Cloth and Food Industry 0.0519 0.2219 0 1 
Timber Industry 0.0536 0.2252 0 1 
Chemical Industry 0.0453 0.2079 0 1 
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Metal Working Industry 0.0708 0.2566 0 1 
Automotive Engineering 0.0499 0.2177 0 1 
Electrical Industry 0.0449 0.2071 0 1 
Construction 0.1569 0.3637 0 1 
Wholesale and Retail 0.1806 0.3847 0 1 
Logistic and Telecommunication 0.0409 0.1980 0 1 
Services for Companies 0.1213 0.3265 0 1 
Research and IT 0.0291 0.1682 0 1 
Services for Households 0.0844 0.2780 0 1 
Healthcare and Education 0.0704 0.2558 0 1 
Number of Establishments 25367       
 
 
Table 5.A2: Descriptive Statistics for Companies with newly Established Works Council in 
the IAB Establishment Panel. 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables:     
Dummy: Newly Established Works 
Council 1.0000 0.0000 1 1 
Explanatory Variables:     
Dummy: Organisational Shock 0.3919 0.4891 0 1 
Partly Plant Closure 0.0147 0.1204 0 1 
Spin-off of a Part of the Establish-
ment 0.0403 0.1970 0 1 
Outsourcing of a Part of the Estab-
lishment 0.0110 0.1044 0 1 
Deviation from Sectoral Growth -0.5345 2.0388 -4.806 5.054001 
Integration of Another Establish-
ment 0.0549 0.2283 0 1 
New Owner 0.0293 0.1690 0 1 
Reorganisation 0.2527 0.4354 0 1 
Employment Growth 0.0007 0.0105 -0.0667 0.0750 
Employee Characteristics:     
Share of Apprentices 0.0540 0.0772 0 1 
Share of Unskilled Workers 0.2331    
Share of Skilled Workers 0.7128 0.2918 0 1 
Share of Part Time Workers 0.1496 0.2227 0 1 
Establishment Characteristics:     
Number of Employees 116.8571 386.5874 6 5982 
Dummy: Collective Barg. Contract 0.5495 0.4985 0 1 
Dummy: Payment above Collective 
Level 0.3883 0.4883 0 1 
Dummy: Establishment founded 
before 1989 0.7179 0.4508 0 1 
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Prospering profit situation 0.3187 0.4668 0 1 
East German Establishment 0.3260 0.4696 0 1 
Export share 6.5971 17.8007 0 100 
Log(Investment per Capita) 5.1832 3.9042 0 12.83 
Dummy: Limited Company 0.8425 0.3649 0 1 
Dummy: Foreign Owned Company 0.0733 0.2610 0 1 
Dummy: Single Side Company 0.0806 0.2727 0 1 
Distribution by Industry:     
Cloth and Food Industry 0.0256 0.1584 0 1 
Timber Industry 0.0623 0.2421 0 1 
Chemical Industry 0.0513 0.2210 0 1 
Metal Working Industry 0.0513 0.2210 0 1 
Automotive Engineering 0.0696 0.2549 0 1 
Electrical Industry 0.0513 0.2210 0 1 
Construction 0.0879 0.2837 0 1 
Wholesale and Retail 0.2161 0.4124 0 1 
Logistic and Telecommunication 0.0586 0.2353 0 1 
Services for Companies 0.1465 0.3543 0 1 
Research and IT 0.0366 0.1882 0 1 
Services for Households 0.0586 0.2353 0 1 
Healthcare and Education 0.0842 0.2783 0 1 
Number of Establishments 273       
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Table 5.A3: Descriptive Statistics for Companies with newly Established Works Council in 
the IfM Bonn Works Council Survey (estimation sample at once). 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables:     
Dummy: Initiator Workforce Alone 0.6167 0.4903 0 1 
Dummy: Initiator Management In-
volved 0.3833 0.4903 0 1 
Trigger Events:     
Workers Voice 0.4333 0.4997 0 1 
Organisational Shock 0.5833 0.4916 0 1 
Managerial Attitude towards Formal  
Employee Representation* 3.1166 1.0591 1 5 
Company Characteristics:     
Number of Employees 174 119 18.6 440 
Squared Number of Employees 44093 50997 346 193600 
Dummy: Owner is Manager 0.3333 0.4754 0 1 
Dummy: Single Side Company 0.3833 0.4903 0 1 
Dummy: Located in East Germany 0.2500 0.4367 0 1 
Distribution by Industry:     
Dummy: Manufacturing 0.2000  0 1 
Dummy: Construction 0.0833 0.2787 0 1 
Dummy: Trade 0.0333 0.1810 0 1 
Dummy: Traffic 0.1000 0.3025 0 1 
Dummy: Service for Companies 0.4833 0.5039 0 1 
Dummy: Service for Households 0.1000 0.3025 0 1 
Number of Observations 60       
* Scale from 1 (very negative attitude) to 5 (very positive attitude). 
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Table 5.A4: Itemized Answers of Trigger Event to Establish a Works Council 
  Total Ob-servation 
Workforce 
Alone 
Management 
Motivated 
Management 
Involved 
New Owner 19 14 0 5 
Partial Plant Closure 2 2 0 0 
Radical Reorganisation 9 6 1 2 
To Improve the Productivity 8 0 1 7 
To Improve the Motivation 3 0 0 3 
Need a Fixed Representative 8 0 2 6 
New Workers with Works Council 
Experience 8 7 0 1 
Conflicts between Management 
and the Workforce 6 5 0 1 
Workers want More Co-
Determination 11 8 0 3 
Management Knows no Reason 16 9 0 7 
Total numbers and percentages, multiple answers possible, source: IfM Bonn Works Council Survey 2005.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis studies the motivation of firms to provide apprenticeship training. Providing 
apprenticeships is one key for closing the gap between supply and the demand for apprentices 
which has been constantly discussed in recent years (Bundesminiterium für Bildung und 
Forschung 2008, Jacobebbinghaus et al. 2009). The demand-supply gap has been alarming 
politicians for more than 35 years and led them to call for economic policy measures to adjust 
the apprenticeship market (Busemeyer 2009). Economic policy measures, however, have to 
be evaluated based on a sophisticated analysis of the apprenticeship market. The key for 
understanding the apprenticeship training market is firms’ training motivation which 
determines the demand for apprentices and firms’ recruiting strategy of apprenticeship 
graduates. 
This thesis highlights that, contrary to previous understanding, the training motivation of 
firms in Germany is heterogeneous. Until recently, the demand of skilled workers was 
generally considered as firms’ primary motivation to train apprentices. This view was 
underpinned by the stylized fact that nearly all training companies bear net-costs during the 
apprenticeship period (Bardeleben et al. 1997, Beicht et al. 2004). Even if same contributions 
remark that the training motivation may be heterogeneous across training firms, regarding 
firm size (Neubäumer and Bellmann 1999) and sector (Franz and Soskice 1995), the fact itself 
was never subjected to scrutiny.  
Therefore, the first part of this thesis demonstrates that firms’ training motivation is 
heterogenous in Germany. This fact is shown using two different approaches: retaining own 
apprenticeship graduates (chapter 2) and differences between occupations in productivity and 
profitability of apprentices compared to unskilled workers (chapter 3). Concerning the 
retention rate, chapter two suggests a method for evaluating firms training motivation using 
the long-term or within-firm retention rate, defined as the proportion of apprenticeship 
graduates staying in the training firm to all apprenticeship graduates. The distribution of the 
within-firm retention rate over several years shows a strong clustering on both extremes. In 
detail, 14 percent of training companies do not retain their own apprenticeship graduates, 
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whereas 26 percent hire nearly all apprenticeship graduates. At minimum, these 14 percent of 
all training companies have no possibility to benefit from returns after the training period, i.e. 
after the apprenticeship termination, and have to extract the benefits during the apprenticeship 
period. In other words, these companies cannot follow an investment strategy. This finding 
adds another interesting stylized fact of apprenticeship training and confirms to the idea of 
different training motivations. Furthermore, this method yields a similar classification as the 
marginal cost approach of the costs-benefits studies and is applicable with publicly available 
longitudinal datasets which allow analyses of broad areas of research questions. 
Chapter three analyses the heterogeneity of firms’ training motivation by evaluating the 
productivity and profitability of apprentices in comparison to unskilled or semi-skilled 
workers during the apprenticeship training period. This comparison reveals an additional view 
on firms’ training motivation because it analysis the short-term opportunities of training 
companies – the employment of apprentices for unskilled work. Chapter three shows that 
apprentices are more productive and more profitable than unskilled workers in white-collar, 
crafts and construction occupations, but less profitable and equally productive in blue-collar 
manufacturing occupations. This finding can be interpreted as a lower bound for the 
investment training motivation: if apprentices are on average not as productive as unskilled 
workers, companies would not employ apprentices in order to cut unit labour costs. In other 
words, they invest in apprentices during the training period (at least as long as wage 
compression is low for unskilled workers). Contrary, training companies can follow a 
substitution training strategy when apprentices are more productive than unskilled workers 
during the training period. 
Both chapters show that two opposing training motivations exist. The training motivation 
drives firms’ demand for apprentices and is the key for understanding the apprenticeship 
training market. Both training motivations lead to different suggestions for policy measures 
designed to influence companies’ demand for apprentices and, hence, the demand-supply gap 
on the apprenticeship training market. Assume, for instance, that all training companies train 
on the investment training motive. Thus, an appropriate policy measure for increasing the 
demand for apprentices is to extend the number of days at the vocational school to learn or 
practice a foreign language. This additional training increases the human capital of 
apprentices on the cost of the government which pays for vocational schools. Consider now 
the substitution training motive. Increasing the number of days at the vocational school would 
c.p. decrease the demand of apprentices. Because the critical variable for substitution 
motivated training firms is the unit labour costs of apprentices. The unit labour costs 
CHAPTER 6: Conclusions 
92 
determine the incidence and intensity of training. More days at the vocational school lowers 
the time of apprentices at the workplace where they work productive, hence increases unit 
labour costs of apprentices compared to unskilled workers.  
The training motivation further determines the recruitment of apprentices. The investment 
training motive implies retaining apprenticeship graduates whereas the substitution training 
motive does not implicate retaining apprenticeship graduates. The recruitment is further of 
theoretical concern because apprenticeship graduates are prone to be poached. Poaching can 
take place because the following preconditions are fulfilled: training companies invest in the 
skill of apprentices, these skills are transferable to and observable by other companies and an 
apprenticeship graduates can not be forced to work in the training company after the training 
period (Stevens 2001, Pischke 2007). Poaching of apprenticeship graduates can lead to an 
under-investment in training, regarding the training content, training duration, training 
incidence and number of apprentices. Therefore, the determinants of recruiting apprentices, in 
particular the existence and determinants of poaching are further keys to a better 
understanding of the apprenticeship training market. 
Chapter four studies the existence and determinants of poaching. It shows that poached firms 
fail to credibly offer long-term contracts. Moreover, training firms more likely poach 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere than non-training firms. This finding can be 
explained with apprentice’s preferences to work in training firms. Moreover, non-training 
firms fail to attract apprenticeship graduates because training firms offer more likely long-
term carrier opportunities. However, poaching does not lead to a non-training equilibrium. A 
large number of firms train although some of their apprenticeship graduates are likely to be 
poached. These firms may have incorporated a certain number of poached apprenticeship 
graduates in their calculation of training.  
Poaching does not lead to a non-training equilibrium. This result is generally ascribed to the 
institutional framework of apprenticeship training in Germany (Finegold and Soskice 1988, 
Soskice 1994, Backes-Gellner 1996, Culpepper 2003). Institutions which are generally 
considered to constitute and foster the apprenticeship training system are employer and 
employee representations. An important employee representation in Germany is the works 
council. Works councils monitor apprenticeship training and foster apprentices’ commitment 
to the training system because they do not fear to be exploited in the training firm. However, 
interdependencies between institutions such as works councils and the apprenticeship training 
system are a hardly researched field.  
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Chapter five investigates the interdependence between apprenticeship training and works 
councils, more specifically whether the apprenticeship training intensity has an influence on 
the probability of establishing a works council. Chapter five finds no significant effect. 
However, this result should be carefully interpreted because chapter five firstly analyses 
interdependencies between a single industrial relations institution, the works councils, and the 
apprenticeship system and secondly neglects a dynamic dimension. A single institution of the 
industrial relation may have no effect on the apprenticeship training but the system of all 
industrial relations institutions may have an effect. This hypothesis that employer and 
employee associations and representations together provide the framework of the 
apprenticeship training system is stressed by Hall and Soskice (2001) and Culpepper (2003). 
Moreover, a dynamic dimension can create interdependencies between institutions in the 
long-run. For instance, the introduction of apprenticeship training or the increasing proportion 
of apprentices may have a lagged positive effect on establishing a works council after several 
years. Both considerations require a much more sophisticated empirical research design about 
institutions which foster apprenticeship training and cause the survival and development of 
such a system.  
Taken together, the main findings of this thesis, the relevance of heterogeneous 
apprenticeship training motivation, determinants of poaching firms and interdependencies to 
institutions of the industrial relations system, request a much more careful design of policy 
measures intended to influence the apprenticeship market. However before intervening in the 
apprenticeship training market, politicians have to consider whether an intervention is 
necessary. Thus, Jacobebbinghaus et al. (2009) show, for instance, that the demographic 
development, in particular the increasing number of school leavers, is the critical variable that 
determines the demand-supply gap whereas the proportion of apprentices on all employees 
remain constant over the last years. Nevertheless if an intervention in the apprenticeship 
training market is necessary this thesis demonstrates that economic policy measures can 
differentially influence the demand of apprentices regarding both training motives. For 
instance, increasing or decreasing the days at the vocational school has a positive impact on 
one but a negative impact on the other training motive. On the contrary, policy measures such 
as training levy and enlarging the training duration may have no or positive effects regarding 
both training motivations. However, interdependencies to other institutions, preferences of 
apprentices, and substitution effects should also be taken into account before suggesting an 
economic policy measure. 
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